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AFTER MEECH LAKE: AN
INSIDER'S VIEW*
PatrickJ. Monahan**
This paper examines the causes of the
failure of the Meech Lake Accord, as well
as the implications of the demise of the
Accordfor Canada'spoliticalfuture. The
paper challenges the prevailing interpretation of the Accord's failure, an interpretation which centers on the shortcomings of political leadership. The paper
argues that the Accord's failure is, in
reality, a product of factors that can be
traced back to the 1982 constitutionalsettlement. The 1982 decision to proceed
without the consent of the government of
Quebec made it necessary to undertake a
subsequent series of negotiationsdesigned
to accommodate Quebec. The problem was
that the amending formula entrenched in
1982 was so inflexible as to make any
such negotiations prone to failure. Further, the predictable outcome of any such
failure would be a destabilization of Quebec's commitment to the Canadianfederation.
The paper draws a number of lessons
from the Meech Lake experience for the
future of constitutional reform in Canada.
It is evident that there is no realistic
possibility of securing a constitutional
amendment addressing Quebec's concerns
under the general amending formula.
Quebec will be faced with the difficult and
fateful decision of either accepting the
status quo, or attempting to jump outside
of the existing rules for constitutional
amendment. The paper analyses the implications of a break in legal continuity,
concluding that it would be contrary to
the best interests of all Canadians.

Dans cet article, on itudie les causes de
l'9chec de l'accord du lac Meech ainsi
que les consofquences de la mort de l'accord pour 'avenir politique du Canada.
L'auteur conteste l'interprdtation dominante de l'9chec de l'accord, interprtation qui est axe sur le manque de leadership politique. L'auteur soutient que
l'6chec de l'accord est dfi, en rialiti, di
des facteurs qui dcoulent de l'entente
constitutionnelle de 1982. En 1982, la
dicision de procidersans le consentement
du gouvernement du Qutbec a rendu n6cessaire la poursuite d'une sirie de nigociations afin de satisfaire les demandes
du Quebec. Le problme est que la procddure de modification de la Constitution
enchdssie en 1982 est tellement rigide que
toute nigociation itait vouie di l'ichec.
De plus, le risultat pr~visible d'un tel
jchec dtait l'affaiblissement de l'engagement du Quebec envers la f&dration canadienne.
L'auteur tire un certain nombre de legons de l'expdrience du lac Meech quant
d l'avenir de la rofforme constitutionnelle
au Canada. Il est ivident qu'en vertu de
la procedure normale de modification il
est impossible de modifier la Constitution
de fagon di ripondre aux prdoccupations
du Qudbec. Le Quibec devra prendre la
difficile et importante dicision d'accepter
le statu quo ou d'essayer de contourner
les regles actuelles de modification de la
Constitution. L'auteur analyse les consjquences d'une rupture dans la continuitj
du droit et conclut que cela irait d l'encontre des intgr~ts de tous les Canadiens
et Canadiennes.

* The text of this paper formed the basis for the Inaugural Thomas G. Feeney
Memorial Lecture, delivered by Professor Monahan at the University of Ottawa,
Faculty of Law, Common Law Section, on 13 October 1990.
""Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. Formerly
Senior Policy Advisor, Office of the Premier, Government of Ontario.
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A

TRIBUTE TO

TOM FEENEY

It is a singular honour to be able to deliver this inaugural lecture
to commemorate the life of Tom Feeney, the founding dean of the
Common Law section at the University of Ottawa Law School.
Tom will be known to those of you here as a man of enormous
intellect and integrity, who devoted the last 31 years of his life to
building this law school. He was at various stages of his long and
varied career a practicing lawyer, a law professor, a law dean and a
legal scholar. I knew him in those roles, but I also had the very special
privilege to know him as a member of his family, through my marriage
to his daughter, Monica.
I first encountered Tom in the early 1970's, in the final years of
Tom's deanship at the law school. As a young and impressionable
student, I regarded "Dean Feeney" as a larger than life character of
truly legendary proportions. On weekends I would arrive at the Feeney
household, ostensibly to visit Monica, but somehow I would always
find myself drawn to the family room where Tom would be ensconced
with his pipe and tobacco expounding his views of life, of teaching
and of the law. I can recall countless hours spent listening to Tom
recounting various incidents of people he had encountered over the
years, either during his years in law practice in New Brunswick or
during his time as a law teacher.
I did not know it at the time, but Tom had already assumed the
role of my teacher, and those days spent in his family room were the
beginnings of my legal education. Tom was fascinated by the law
because he was fascinated by people. He saw in the law not some dry
doctrine or idea but an opportunity to probe the characters and the
passions of the people who must live with the laws that some make.
Tom's love of the law and of teaching was contagious, and I had
been bitten by the bug. Upon graduation from my undergraduate
studies, I proceeded on to law school. Some years later, I had the
good fortune to become a law teacher at Osgoode Hall in Toronto.
Had you asked me at the time why I chose that particular career path,
I would no doubt have given some suitably vague answer. Only now,
years later, do I look back and realize the enormous impact that Tom
had upon me and the extent of my personal indebtedness to him.
Tom Feeney began his career in law teaching in the late 1940's
at Dalhousie Law School. Following his graduation as gold medallist
in Dalhousie's 1946 class, he was immediately invited back as a
member of the full-time faculty and made the switch from student to
professor at the ripe age of 22. In 1950, he left Dalhousie to join his
father, Gregory Thomas Feeney, in law practice in Campbellton, New
Brunswick. He remained in private practice until 1957 when Father
Danis of the University of Ottawa came to Dalhousie in search of law
teachers for Ottawa's fledgling law school. Tom was still remembered
and highly regarded by the faculty at Dalhousie and Father Danis was
told that the best person to build his new law school was a little known

Ottawa Law Review/Revue de droit d'Ottawa

[Vol. 22:2

lawyer named Feeney who was practicing in small-town New Brunswick.
Father Danis travelled north to Campbellton and convinced Tom
to leave his extended family and friends in New Brunswick and take
up the challenge of founding the first Ontario law school outside the
city of Toronto. Here was a man made for such a challenge. Tom
turned to the task of building this school with energy, vigour and
commitment, making it his life's work for the next 31 years.
During Tom's 16 years as director and then dean of Common
Law, he cultivated and relished his reputation as a tough and exacting
task-master and disciplinarian. Students from those early days recall
his performances in the classroom as a mixture of law and theatre.
Tom would warm to his subject by recounting in vivid terms the facts
of particular cases, taking on the tone and arguments of the individuals
featured in them. Tom's approach to teaching was intensely practical.
He loved the law, particularly the common law, because he saw in it
the embodiment of common sense. Nor was he shy about criticizing a
case or a judge who had violated what he saw as the common sense
principles of the common law. But this fearless criticism of the law
was merely a measure of the man's devotion to it. Tom's style in the
classroom was unique and effective. He was deeply dedicated to the
craft of teaching and was beloved and admired by his students, who
universally recall him as the best classroom teacher they encountered
in their days in university.
Tom Feeney's exams were also legendary in their own way,
calculated to inspire fear and respect in those required to write them.
For many professors, there was no "right answer" to a particular
question; the point of a question was simply to elicit from the students
their understanding of the competing arguments on both sides of a
particular issue. Such was not Tom Feeney's style. On a Feeney exam,
there was always a right answer and a wrong answer. Your task was
to distinguish between the two, in as brief terms as possible, with a
full and complete reference to the relevant case or cases as authority
for your answer.
I learned first-hand of the terrors of the Feeney exam during my
days as a law student at Osgoode Hall in Toronto. Each spring I would
be required to write two separate sets of exams. The first were my
regular law school exams in Toronto. Then, upon my return to Ottawa
for the summer, I would be expected to write Tom's annual final exam
in his property or wills course. Tom said that he wanted to find out
whether they really taught you anything at those fancy Toronto law
schools. Through a mixture of bluff, guesswork and luck I managed
to survive these annual rituals relatively unscathed - but I resolved
to myself that the Feeney style of examining was totally outmoded and
ought to be abolished as a form of cruel and unusual punishment.
Now, in a bizarre twist of fate, I find my own examining style as a
law teacher gravitating more and more to the supposedly outmoded
Feeney approach. I have yet to sort out in my own mind whether this
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unexpected turn of events represents what is known as the maturing
process.
Tom cultivated his reputation for toughness and discipline, but
underneath the gruff exterior there was a softer and humane personality.
Tom believed that the time to "weed out" the weaker students was
during the first year of law school. Anyone who survived the first year
would then be taken under his wing and he would dedicate himself to
ensuring that they completed their full three years of law study. He
became for upper year students a sort of a cross between a shepherd
and a father-figure, guiding them through the shoals and the tribulations
of law school. Students were encouraged to come to Tom whenever
they were experiencing problems, whether those problems were academic, personal or even financial. In fact, Tom made it his business
to know whenever one of the members of "his flock" was having
difficulty; he would search that person out and attempt to do whatever
he could to remedy the problem. Tom was intensely concerned about
the personal as well as the intellectual welfare of his students. This
commitment and involvement helps to account for the genuine and
quite remarkable loyalty which one encounters amongst graduates of
this law school in relation to Tom Feeney.
Tom also let down his gruff exterior in social gatherings, which
were a frequent feature of the law school calendar in those days. Tom
and Dorene would regularly open their home to the students, with the
entire student body becoming almost a kind of extended family for the
Feeney's. Dorene was just as interested in the progress of the students
as was Tom. At social gatherings, Dorene would assure the students
that Tom was "not as tough as he sounds", which would evoke a
shrug or perhaps a laugh from the man himself, who would then carry
on with his business.
Tom built the school literally from the ground up, and it was a
painstaking and time-consuming process. Beginning with a few classrooms on the fourth floor of the Arts Building and with limited financial
resources, Tom assembled a first-class faculty, combining full-time
professors such as Arthur Foote, Bruce Dunlop, Bert Hubbard, Donat
Pharand and Jim Hendry with part-timers recruited over time from
leading members of the Ottawa bar such as Gordon Henderson, Royden
Hughes, Adrian and Paul Hewitt, John Read and Magistrate Martin
for criminal law. Father Danis, who was apparently known as the
"Regent" of the Law School, was encouraged to teach his own unique
brand of jurisprudence. The law library was a converted classroom on
the fourth floor of the arts building with a modest collection of
Canadian statutes and law reports.
The dean's responsibilities extended to the prosaic but necessary
matter of bricks and mortar. Tom spearheaded the task of planning and
constructing a new building to house the law school, culminating in
the opening of this modern and excellent facility in the early 1970's.
In the years following his deanship, Tom turned his energies to
writing and scholarship, producing three editions of his widely cited
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and respected text on the law of wills.' FEENEY ON WILLS was the
first comprehensive text on the laws of wills and succession in Canada.
It has become the leading work in the field, frequently referred to by
courts of all levels and jurisdictions across the country. Experts in the
field have told me that it will continue to be treated as a classic
authority for many years by courts and legal scholars.
Tom's other passion throughout his life was his family - his
wife Dorene, his six children and their spouses, along with his numerous grandchildren, which currently number 14 and still counting.
It was a special and enriching experience to be a part of that family
and to experience first-hand the extraordinary passion, conviction and
integrity of Tom Feeney. He marked and guided all of us in an
unforgettable way, just as he shaped the development of this important
and now mature law school. This lecture series established in his name
is a welcome and fitting tribute, since it will keep alive the memory
of Tom Feeney's time with us and of our enormous personal indebtedness and gratitude to him.
I. INTRODUCTION

In the four months since the demise of the Meech Lake Accord2
on June 23, 1990, most Canadians have taken a welcome time out
from our seemingly interminable national preoccupation with the Constitution. In the middle of June, with First Ministers huddled behind
closed doors in Ottawa for a week, Canadians identified national unity
as the single most important issue facing the country. But with the
native standoff at Oka and the crisis in the Persian Gulf dominating
the political scene since then, the "national unity" issue has begun to
fade from the national political consciousness.
Yet in the midst of this respite from debates over the Constitution,
there is not much joy or relief visible across the land. Instead, there
is a sense that the "fault-line" of Canadian politics shifted in a
fundamental and irrevocable way on June 23rd. Precisely what this

shift amounted to is difficult to articulate with any precision. Perhaps
one way of expressing it is to say that the idea of Canada as a
permanent fixture on the political landscape died on that day. Since
June 23rd, there has been an unspoken but palpable assumption that,

T.G. Feeney, THE CANADIAN LAW OF WILLS, 3d ed. (Toronto: Butterworths,

1987).

2 Canada, House of Commons, Constitution Amendment, 1987, Being the
Schedule of a Motion for a Resolution to Authorize an Amendment to the Constitution
of Canada made pursuant to the 1987 ConstitutionalAccord in Debates, vol. VIII,
2nd sess., 33rd Parl., at 10408-10 (26 October 1987), reprinted in R. Gibbins, ed.,
MEECH LAKE AND CANADA: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE WEST (Edmonton: Academic,

1988) at 270 [hereinafter Meech Lake Accord or simply Accord].
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from now on, all bets are off. Canada and Canadians had entered a
new political era, an era in which no political structure, and even the
idea of Canada itself, could no longer be taken for granted. Canadians
are the heirs of a counter-revolutionary tradition and have always been
content to remain within the marked boundaries of established and
well-charted political channels. Now, for the first time, there is a sense
that Canadians are prepared to break with their traditions and turn their
collective bow towards uncharted waters.
Surveying the political landscape in the fall of 1990, it is difficult
to summon up great optimism about our ability to overcome our
current predicament. The fallout from the failure of the Meech Lake
Accord has opened very deep wounds across the country and fed
historic regional grievances. Opinion polls have been telling us for
many years that a growing number of Canadians in all parts of the
country believe that their particular region receives too few benefits
and too many burdens from Confederation. 3 The failure of the Accord
cannot help but increase this sense of regional alienation and heighten
the urgency of claims for redress.
Quebec public opinion, in particular, has been radicalized by the
failure of the Meech Lake Accord, and there is now unprecedented
support for political independence or "sovereignty-association" with
the rest of the country. With the death of Meech, Premier Bourassa
declared that Canada was "not eternal" and that Quebecers would
undertake a fundamental re-examination of their links with the rest of
the country. The National Assembly has constituted an extraordinary
Parliamentary Commission to formulate a new series of Quebec proposals to present to Canada by March 28, 1991. 4 The Quebec Liberal
Party has initiated a parallel review process scheduled to be completed
by March 9, 1991.
Elsewhere, however, there seems little patience for another effort
to address Quebec's demands. Unlike in the late 1970's, there is a
widespread sense that perhaps it is time to "let them go" coupled with
the associated belief that a Canada without Quebec is viable. At a
minimum, there is an insistence that any future constitutional round
must deal with the concerns and grievances of all regions, rather than
simply those of Quebec. Increasingly, voices are being raised in other
parts of the country arguing that the existing federal structure is
outmoded and must be fundamentally restructured. There is a growing
sense across the country that national political institutions are no longer
capable of representing the will of the people. The growing popularity

3 See, e.g., Environics Research Group, Focus CANADA REPORT, 1990-91
(1990), which found that three-quarters of Canadians thought that the federal government showed regional favouritism while very few people thought their own province
was favoured.
4 An Act to Establish the Commission on the Political and Constitutional
Future of Quebec, S.Q. 1990, c. 34.
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of the Reform Party in Western Canada and the CORE party elsewhere
are manifestations of this desire for a "new deal" in which the regions
will be better represented in national political institutions. The election
of the New Democratic Party in Ontario on September 6, 1990 is an
indication that this desire for new approaches and solutions has taken
hold even in once-staid Ontario.
The highly emotional and symbolic quality of this debate means
it will be extremely difficult to bridge the differences which exist. But
the problem is further complicated by the lack of any widely accepted
and legitimate process for addressing and resolving these concerns.
One thing upon which everyone seems agreed is that the elitist and
closed-door character of the Meech Lake process has been discredited.
However, there have been few constructive or concrete suggestions
about what, if anything, should replace bargaining between First
Ministers as a basis for amending the Constitution. There is, instead,
only an overwhelming cynicism about the motives of our politicial
leaders and a rejection of their right to amend the Constitution through
a series of closed-door bargaining sessions.
So I do not think it is an overstatement to conclude that the
Canada of 1990 is in serious trouble. Some years ago, it was common
to hear Canadians quote with both pride and expectation Laurier's
prediction that the twentieth century would belong to Canada. We are
now facing a situation where there is a serious possibility that Canada
as we know it will not even survive the century, much less lay claim
to it.
Whether Canada does survive in roughly its current form will
depend, I believe, on our ability to do two things. The first is to come
to a deeper and more realistic understanding of how we arrived at our
present predicament. In particular, this requires us to come to a more
balanced understanding of what went wrong in the Meech process. As
a participant in that process, my perspective is no doubt highly
compromised. 5 But I regard much of the criticism of the Meech process
to be shallow and unenlightening. The criticism has been unduly
focused on personalities and political leaders, virtually ignoring a
systematic analysis of why the Meech process unfolded in the manner
it did.
Public policy does not develop in a vacuum, nor does it happen
by accident. The actions and choices of political leaders are always
an attempt to balance numerous competing claims and constraints.
Moreover, the margin for manoeuvre possessed by political leaders is
always far more limited than is suggested by popular accounts of their

5 I served as a Constitutional Advisor to the Premier and to the Attorney
General of Ontario from July 1986 until September 1990. In that capacity, I attended
the meetings at Meech Lake and the Langevin Block in 1987 as well as the weeklong meeting at the Conference Centre in Ottawa in June 1990.
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activities. These observations are commonplace, even trite, but they
seem to have been forgotten in the chorus of criticism that has
developed regarding the Meech Lake process. The Meech Lake Accord, far from being a product of arrogant or wilful political leaders,
was an attempt to respond to a series of very powerful constraints and
contradictory political pressures. These pressures and constraints greatly
limited the range of available options and forced political leaders to
pursue a narrow and very focused strategy. What is remarkable is not
so much that this strategy failed but that it came so close to achieving
success.

My first goal, then, is to provide an account of why the Meech
process unfolded in the manner it did and to identify the reasons for
its failure. Here I will challenge what is fast becoming the conventional
understanding: that the Meech Lake Accord failed because elitist
politicians attempted to amend the Constitution in an illegitimate
manner and without proper public consultation. The fundamental problem with this conventional understanding is that it mistakes effects for
causes. The secretive nature of the Meech process was a direct result
of the conditions under which it was required to be negotiated. These
conditions made it extremely difficult to achieve a successful outcome
and structured the manner in which the negotiations were conducted.
I will identify the nature of these obstacles, how they affected the
negotiations, and what impact they will have in the future. In essence,
my argument will be that the key to understanding the reasons for the
failure of the Meech Lake Accord lies in an analysis of the events of
1982 rather than those of 1987. I will suggest that it was the constitutional settlement of 1982 which set in motion a series of events and
pressures which ultimately led us to our present predicament.
Coming to a balanced assessment of why the Meech Lake Accord
failed is important for more than mere historical reasons. The constraints and political forces which led to failure in the Meech process
are still very much with us. These political forces will continue to
constrain and to shape our political future, just as they have conditioned
our political past. Unless we come to an awareness of their import
and understand their influence, we will be certain to repeat our past
mistakes.
A second precondition for success in the next round of discussions
is a realistic assessment of the costs and the implications associated
with various alternatives for fundamental constitutional change. There
is currently a tendency to overemphasize the shortcomings of our
current political institutions, coupled with a romantic view of the
benefits of the possible alternatives. The reality is that our current
political institutions have proven themselves to be remarkably durable
and flexible, while the alternatives are untested and will certainly
produce effects that are virtually impossible to identify in advance.
Moreover, there are very formidable political and legal obstacles standing in the path of anyone who would seek to fundamentally re-order
our political institutions.
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Thus in the second part of the lecture I will look ahead to the
future round of constitutional negotiations. I will identify the very
formidable challenges which confront Canadians in the wake of the
failure of the Meech Lake Accord. I will then sketch out the possible
options for constitutional change that will likely attain prominence in
the discussions of the next 12-18 months. Finally, I will assess the
likelihood that any of these options could actually form an adequate
response to our emerging political challenges.
II.

WHY DID MEECH FAIL?

There have been a variety of explanations offered for the failure
of the Meech Lake Accord. One explanation is that the contents of
the Accord were simply unacceptable to the vast majority of Canadians.
Of course, few Canadians were familiar with the details of the agreement itself. But the agreement assumed a symbolic quality which
conditioned Canadians' understanding of its meaning and their support
for its contents.
The symbolic meaning of the Meech Lake Accord revolved6
around the debate over the significance of the "distinct society" clause.
For Quebecers, the distinct society clause and Meech itself was a
symbol of belonging. By accepting the symbolic recognition of Quebec
as a "distinct society", the rest of Canada would have been validating
Quebec's sense of its own identity and promising that that identity
could be accommodated within Canadian federalism. Outside of Quebec, on the other hand, the Accord had become a negative symbol a symbol that one province was being granted special privileges not
accorded to all provinces or to other constitutionally significant groups.
These contradictory symbolic images of the Meech Lake Accord,
and the absence of a bridge between them, provides us with one
account of the circumstances in which it failed. A related explanation
for the failure of the Accord is the process which led to its adoption.
There are two often-repeated complaints about the Meech Lake process.
The first has to do with the secretive, closed-door nature of the
negotiations which led to its creation. The process provided minimal
opportunities for public input and culminated in the political brinksmanship associated with the Prime Minister's infamous "toss of the
dice". A second complaint about the process was the unwillingness of
governments and political leaders to entertain changes to the Meech
Lake Accord once it had been drafted. The Accord was declared to
be a "seamless web" that could only be changed in the event of an
"egregious error".
The critics of the Meech process argue that the 1981-82 constitutional negotiations were conducted on a much different footing.

6 S. 1.
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Roger Gibbins, for example, has argued that in 1981, the Canadian
public was intensely involved in the constitutional process prior to the
final meeting in November of 1981. Thus, while that debate culminated
in a secret meeting of First Ministers, the prior public discussions had
"set the context for and unquestionably shaped the outcome of those
deliberations". 7 Furthermore, as Gibbins points out, the final product
of the closed-door discussions in 1981 was itself subject to modification
and change.
The 1987 process, on the other hand, was conducted on an
entirely different basis. Gibbins argues that there was no serious public
debate preceding the meeting of First Ministers on April 30, 1987.
Furthermore, the final text signed by First Ministers on June 3, 1987
was declared to be a seamless web which had to be ratified as is; the
only possibility of changes would come in a "second round" of
discussions following the ratification of the Meech Lake Accord. 8
These various explanations for the failure of the Accord immediately give rise to a second question: simply put, this question is
"why"? What accounts for the negative symbolism associated with the
Meech Lake Accord? Why did political leaders choose to negotiate
the deal behind closed doors without any provision for public participation? To these questions, there tends to be a uniform, recurring
answer. The critics of Meech tend to lay ultimate blame for its failure
at the feet of the political leaders implicated in its creation. Political
leadership, or its absence, is blamed for the fact that the debate over
the Meech Lake Accord tended to be framed in highly symbolic terms.
The Accord attained symbolic significance, it is said, because political
leaders imbued it with this significance. Quebecers were told by their
political leaders that a rejection of Meech was a rejection of Quebec.
English Canadians, on the other hand, were subjected to threats and
"blackmail" by political leaders who warned that Meech must be
ratified or disaster would follow.
Political leadership was also blamed for the closed-door process
associated with the drafting of the Accord. Alan Cairns, one of our
leading political scientists, has summed up the reaction of many
thoughtful Canadians to the Meech Lake process; he describes it as
"an oracular, ex cathedra style of governing more appropriate to
theocratic rulers dictating to the faithful than to elected political leaders
explaining themselves to the citizens to whom they are accountable". 9
Cairns' emphasis on the "style of governing" associated with the
Meech Lake Accord reinforces the assumption that it is the personalities

7 R. Gibbins, A Sense of Unease: The Meech Lake Accord and ConstitutionMaking in Canada in Gibbins, ed., supra, note 2, 121 at 123.
8 Ibid. at 124-25.
9 Ottawa, the Provinces, and Meech Lake in Gibbins, ed., supra, note 2, 105

at 109.
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and the behaviour of political leadership which were primarily to blame
for its failure.
These criticisms of political leadership are undoubtedly correct in
many respects; the process was highly secretive, there was limited
public discussion prior to a final agreement being signed and changes
in the agreement were virtually ruled out from the very start. But this
line of criticism, because it focuses on personalities and political
leadership is, I would argue, ultimately misleading. It mistakes effects
for causes, thereby diverting attention from a serious inquiry into the
reasons the Meech Lake Accord failed.
I will argue that the real underlying explanation for the failure of
the Accord lies not in the events of 1987 but in the events of 1982.
The Meech Lake process should be understood as a response to the
political inheritance of the 1981-82 constitutional settlement. There
were two central elements of this "political inheritance" which together
defined the paths which subsequent political leaders would tread and
shaped the product of their journey.
The first element of this "political inheritance" was the ground
rules for constitutional change. The ConstitutionAct, 198210 established

a new set of decision rules for future constitutional amendments that
were extremely rigid and unwieldy. The attempt to satisfy these unwieldy decision rules was a central preoccupation of the Meech round
and constitutes an important part of the story of why it failed. The
second element of the political inheritance of 1982 was the decision
to proceed in the absence of Quebec, the so-called "exclusion" of
Quebec. The decision to proceed without Quebec in 1981 defined the
subject matter of the Meech round and had important implications for
the manner in which those negotiations had to be conducted. Whether
Quebec's exclusion in 1982 was "justified" in some absolute sense is
not my concern. The point is that the exclusion of Quebec made
necessary a set of negotiations structured around the idea of "bringing
Quebec back in" to the Constitution. It also significantly increased the
political risks associated with such a set of negotiations while at the
same time reducing the prospects for a successful outcome.
By tracing the failure of the Meech Lake Accord back to the
1982 round of negotiations, I am merely reiterating the simple truth
which I identified earlier. This simple verity is that for every cause
there is an effect and that political choices are always a response to
real or to perceived constraints which exist in a particular political
environment. The Meech Lake Accord, as with all political choice,
must be situated in the context of the structural limitations and constraints which conditioned its development. This is not to suggest that
the participants in the process were utterly blameless or rendered
entirely helpless in the face of external pressure. Nor should it be
10Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter
Constitution Act, 1982].
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supposed that the structural factors somehow predetermined the outcome. Real choices and options did exist, despite the constraints
imposed by the political and legal environment. The point is that it is
only possible to come to a balanced assessment of the choices that
were made by situating them in the context in which they were made.
A.

The PoliticalInheritance of 1982: The Amending Formula

Much of the public discussion surrounding the adoption of the
ConstitutionAct, 1982 related to the decision to entrench fundamental
rights in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.1 Yet an
equally important, if less prominent feature of the Constitution Act,
1982 was the new amending formula for future constitutional amendments. In fact, the Meech Lake round of discussions is important
evidence that the 1982 amending formula may have far greater effects
on Canada's politicial evolution than anything contained in the Charter.
There were three elements of the amending formula which had profound implications for the Meech Lake round of discussions: the first
was the requirement of unanimous provincial consent for a number of
important constitutional amendments; the second was the three-year
time limit for certain constitutional amendments; and, the third was
the requirement that constitutional amendments be ratified by provincial
legislatures. Let me examine in turn each of these elements and trace
their implications for the Meech Lake round of discussions.
1.

The First Element: The Unanimity Requirement

One of the most important elements structuring any set of negotiations is the level of consent required in order to reach agreement.
Prior to 1982, the precise level of consent required for a constitutional
amendment had been a matter of protracted political and legal debate.
The Constitution Act, 1982 settled the controversy by providing that
for certain amendments, unanimous provincial consent was required.12
This requirement proved significant in 1986 when Quebec announced its "five conditions" for consenting to the 1982 Constitution.
Under the rules established by the ConstitutionAct, 1982, at least two
of Quebec's "five conditions" required the consent of all ten provinces
and the federal Houses. This meant that any constitutional settlement
of Quebec's demands would require unanimous consent of all eleven
governments and legislatures.
A decision rule requiring unanimity is bound to produce quite
different bargaining behaviour than a rule requiring some lesser degree

11Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act
1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
12 S. 41.
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of consent. A unanimity requirement, because it gives each party a
veto, tends to encourage inflexibility and an unwillingness to compromise from one's preferred or optimal bargaining position. A province
which refuses to compromise can do so with the certainty that the
other parties to the negotiation are powerless to override their objections. Some lesser requirement of consent, on the other hand, introduces an element of uncertainty into the negotiations. Under this
decision rule, no single province or even group of provinces can hold
to their original or preferred position without the fear that some other
coalition will be formed which will override their objections. Each
party to the negotiation faces the risk that the need for their consent
will be dispensed with entirely, with the result that their concerns will
not be reflected at all in the final bargain. This uncertainty acts as a
powerful incentive for all the participants to compromise and to seek
common ground, thereby increasing the likelihood of a negotiated
settlement.
A requirement of unanimity makes it more difficult to reach
agreement for a second, related reason. Because each party has a veto
on the outcome, there is a strong temptation to try and link the subject
matter of the negotiations to other unrelated matters. Any party to the
negotiations can attempt to extract concessions on these other, unrelated
matters in return for their agreement on the particular issues under
negotiation. It is obvious that any attempt to introduce extraneous
matters into the negotiations significantly reduces the likelihood of a
successful outcome. It multiplies the issues which need to be resolved
and makes it less likely that an acceptable set of trade-offs can be
constructed.
The crucial effect of these different decision rules on bargaining
behaviour is dramatically illustrated by the 1981 round of constitutional
negotiations. The distinctive feature of these negotiations was that they
began on the footing that unanimous provincial consent was required,
followed by a period when only "substantial consent" was thought
necessary. In September 1981, the Supreme Court of Canada had
determined that some undefined level of provincial consent was required, and this requirement was conventional only as opposed to
strictly "legal".' 3 By comparing the behaviour of governments in the
first period with their behaviour following the Supreme Court's decision, we can obtain an important illustration of the crucial impact
which decision rules have on bargaining behaviour. Significantly, the
bargaining behaviour of the provinces varied dramatically depending
on which decision rule governed the negotiations.
Prior to September 1981, when the provinces maintained that
unanimous consent was necessary, the eight provinces opposed to the
13 A.G. Manitoba v. A.G. Canada, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753, (sub nom. Ref. Re
Amendment of the Constitution of Canada (Nos. 1,2,3)) 125 D.L.R. (3d) 1 [hereinafter
Patriation Reference cited to D.L.R.].
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federal government's proposals maintained a common front of opposition. Each member of the "gang of eight"'14 adhered strictly to a
common set of demands and refused to entertain any compromise in
their position. However, after the Supreme Court of Canada determined
that only "substantial consent" was required,' 5 the provinces found it
impossible to maintain this common front. At the November 1981
First Ministers' Conference, seven of the eight dissident provinces
compromised and reached an agreement with the federal government;
the pressure to compromise was so great that the parties to the
agreement were prepared to proceed in the absence of the province of
Quebec and risk the "incalculable consequences" promised by Quebec
Premier Rena L6vesque.
(a) Implications
The unanimity requirement had one rather obvious impact on the
Meech Lake round; because the Accord required the consent of all the
legislatures, two provinces with less than ten per cent of the national
population were able to block its passage. However, the impact and
significance of the unanimity requirement was evident from the very
beginning of the process, not just at its conclusion. Because each
province had an absolute veto, there was a limited incentive for
compromise and each province's concerns would have to be met before
an agreement could be obtained. Moreover, there was no other source
of countervailing pressure on any of the provinces which might have
induced them to compromise or modify their positions. This structured
the negotiations throughout and foreshadowed the "province's round"
character of the eventual outcome.
Quebec came to the table seeking symbolic recognition of its
distinctiveness as well as a number of defined powers designed to
preserve and promote this distinct identity. Every other government
around the table had a veto over the negotiations. And these other
governments had both substantive and symbolic interests in the outcome of the negotiations. In particular, a number of provinces were
firmly committed to the principle of the equality of the provinces. This
was a principle which the "gang of eight" had fiercely fought for in
the 1982 negotiations. They had succeeded in securing its recognition
in the 1982 constitutional settlement, particularly in the amending
formula which rejected the concept of vetoes for individual provinces
in favour of a generalized right to "opt out". 16 Each province had also
secured an individual veto over any future changes to the amending

14

The "gang of eight" consisted of the Premiers of the provinces of Alberta,

British Columbia, Manitoba, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island,
Quebec and Saskatchewan.
15 PatriationReference, supra, note 13 at 103.
16 Constitution Act, 1982, s. 38(3).
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formula. The provinces which had fought for and secured acceptance
of the equality principle in 1982 were certain to resist any attempt to
diminish its centrality in the Meech discussions.
The obvious solution was to grant Quebec the special powers
which it desired while granting similar powers, to the extent possible,
to all other governments. Thus Quebec's demand for a veto on future
constitutional amendments could be met by extending a similar veto
to all governments. 17 This "squared the circle" between Quebec's
demand for recognition on the one hand and the provincial equality
principle on the other. The only Quebec demand not susceptible to this
solution was the "distinct society" clause; but this was largely symbolic
and was expressly declared not to diminish the powers of any other
government. 18
This approach - meeting each of Quebec's five conditions by
generalizing those conditions in favour of all the provinces - has
been severely criticized by a number of commentators. However, the
unanimity requirement inherited from 1982 meant that an approach
along these lines represented the only practical way of arriving at a
negotiated agreement. Any other approach would have been confronted
with the fact that a single province possessed a veto over the total
package. And, as we shall see, certain other features of the Meech
Lake discussions made the consequences of failure very significant,
thus increasing the pressure to achieve agreement.
2.

The Second Element: The Three Year Time Limit

The parties to the Accord proceeded on the footing that the
agreement was subject to a three year ratification period. 19 This is in
contrast to the 1981-82 round, in which there was no formal time limit
for the ratification by the Federal Houses and the Parliament at Westminster.
The paradoxical effect of the three year ratification period 20 was
that the process would take longer than had there been no fixed time
limit at all. Because of the extended period available for ratification,
a number of governments proceeded at a rather leisurely pace before
seeking legislative ratification of the Meech Lake Accord. By the end
of 1987, nearly seven months after the Accord had been signed, it had
been ratified by only three provinces, Quebec, Alberta and Saskatch-

'1

Meech Lake Accord, ss 9-11.

is Ibid. s. 1.

19There was some debate over whether this three year time limit was required
under the Constitution or whether it was simply a "political" requirement. See G.
Robertson, A HOUSE DIVIDED: MEECH LAKE SENATE REFORM AND THE CANADIAN
UNION (Halifax: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1989) at 15-20, for an
argument that the Meech Lake Accord was not subject to any time limit.
20 ConstitutionAct, 1982, s. 39(2).
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ewan. Contrast this with the experience in 1981; there was no time
limit for ratification, yet the period between intergovernmental agreement and ratification was less than five months. 2'
There is an inverse relationship between the length of time
required for ratification and the likelihood that an amendment will
become law. The first and most obvious reason is that the passage of
time brings with it the possibility that governments might change.
Given the inherently adversarial relationship between governments and
opposition parties in a parliamentary system of government, opposition
parties who come to power will not necessarily want to carry forward
with the constitutional projects of their predecessors.
The passage of time decreases the likelihood of an amendment
being ratified for a second, less direct reason. In any political situation,
delay tends to favour the opponents of a measure. Delay provides the
political opposition with the opportunity to mobilize support and to
focus attention on the political costs of any proposed measure. Indeed,
many political battles are won or lost on process questions rather than
on the substantive merits, with opponents concentrating their energy
on defeating a proposal through the simple expedient of forcing a
delay in its consideration.
In the Meech Lake round, delay clearly worked against the
ratification of the Accord. Within months of the agreement, two
governments who were not parties to it had been elected and had
evinced doubts about proceeding with ratification. 22 More importantly,
a broadly based and well-organized opposition to the Accord had
developed amongst women's goups, native organizations and other
"rights seeking" groups. While it initially enjoyed significant public
support, by the end of 1987 public support for the Accord began
dropping like a stone. Clearly, time was on the side of the opponents
of the Meech Lake Accord. As the deadline of June 23, 1990 approached, certain commentators suggested that the deadline was "artificial" and should be extended to permit more time for public debate.
But given the inverse relationship between delay and the successful
ratification of a measure, such a further delay would have been futile,
only further eroding public and governmental support and eliminating
the slim chances of the Accord becoming law. Thus there was no
attempt to extend the deadline for ratification for the simple reason
that such an extension would have decreased rather than increased the
chances of the Accord's success.
21

The agreement was signed on November 5, 1981; the Canada Act, 1982

(U.K.), 1982, c. 11, was enacted by the Parliament of the United Kingdom on March
25, 1982 and was given Royal Assent on March 29, 1982. Of course, it should be
noted that, in 1981, only the federal houses and the British Parliament had to ratify

the constitutional resolution, obviously the primary reason for the speedier ratification.
22 New Brunswick elected a Liberal government led by Frank McKenna to
replace Richard Hatfield's Conservatives, while Manitoba replaced the N.D.P. gov-

ernment led by Howard Pawley with a Conservative government led by Gary Filmon.
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The Third Element: The Requirement of Legislative Ratification

The 1982 amendment procedure entrenched a requirement of
23
ratification by all legislatures for certain constitutional amendments.
This represented a very significant change from 1981-82. Even though
the Supreme Court of Canada had declared that the "substantial consent" of the provinces was required for fundamental constitutional
change, this merely required the consent of governments as opposed
to legislatures. The only legislative resolution in the 1981-82 round
was the resolution approved by the Senate and House of Commons.
There were three principal effects flowing out of the requirement
of legislative ratification, all of them tending to make ratification more
difficult. The first and most obvious effect was delay; with eleven
legislative resolutions required, the time period between intergovernmental agreement and final ratification would be much longer. Given
the inverse relationship between delay and the prospects for ratification
outlined above, this longer time period represented a significant additional hurdle. The second, related effect of requiring legislative approval was to increase the opportunities for opponents of the Meech
Lake Accord to block ratification. Opponents of the Accord could
attempt to take advantage of the various mechanisms which opposition
parties possess to block government measures within the individual
legislative processes. This was particularly significant in Manitoba with
the government in a minority situation after April 26, 1988. The
minority position of the government in Manitoba meant that any
modifications in the Accord designed to permit its ratification had to
receive the support of at least one of the opposition parties, in addition
to the government of the province. Nor would the support of the party
leaders necessarily guarantee ratification, as the experience in Manitoba
in June 1990 illustrated. The opposition of a single member, Elijah
Harper,24 resulted in the Accord never even coming to a vote prior to
the June 23rd deadline.
The third effect flowing out of the requirement of legislative
approval was more indirect but was arguably the most important. There
is no mechanism which currently exists to co-ordinate the decisions or
the deliberations of individual legislatures. Yet the amending formula
requires each legislature to enact precisely identical constitutional
resolutions. This requirement of identical resolutions from eleven different legislatures presented a co-ordination problem of very considerable proportions. Each legislature would consider a constitutional
resolution in isolation, without any framework for co-ordinating its
individual deliberations with those taking place in other provinces or

23 Constitution Act, 1982, ss 41 and 42.

24 N.D.P. Member of the Legislative Assembly of Manitoba, representing the
constituency of Rupertsland.
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between governments. The absence of an effective "feedback loop"
meant that if each legislature was permitted to enact amendments on
its own, it would prove impossible to ensure that identical resolutions
were enacted by all eleven legislatures and the process would be
rendered unworkable.
The only mechanism or forum which provided an opportunity for
trade-offs to be made between competing provincial positions was
negotiations amongst First Ministers. These negotiations are typically
designed to reach agreement on a formal legal text embodying a
proposed constitutional amendment. Any such legal text will necessarily reflect a series of trade-offs, with the final wording representing a
delicate balance between the competing positions of the various parties.
What is crucial to remember is that even a relatively minor
change in that wording will upset that balance and eliminate the
consensus which formed the basis of the agreement in the first place.
Thus even apparently minor changes will require a re-opening of
negotiations designed to take account of any changes that have been
made.
A concrete example from the Meech Lake discussions will illustrate the crucial impact of even minor changes in legal wording. The
communique of April 30, 1987 included a stipulation that the federal
government would provide compensation to a province that did not
participate in a shared-cost program in an area of exclusive provincial
jurisdiction if the province undertook an initiative that was compatible
with "national objectives". There was a good deal of criticism of this
provision between the Meech Lake meeting and the Langevin meeting
in June 1987, with critics suggesting that there should be greater
precision regarding the meaning of "national objectives". This matter
was extensively debated during the Langevin meeting with the governments of Ontario and Manitoba insisting that the "national objectives"
had to be defined by the Parliament of Canada, rather than by the
provincial governments. There was some resistance to this argument
from the province of Quebec, which had been maintaining publicly
that the "national objectives" did not necessarily refer to the particular
objectives associated with the shared-cost program that was under
consideration.
The result of these discussions was that the final legal text was
clarified to specify that the shared-cost program was to be "established
by the Government of Canada";25 this implicitly recognized that the
objectives of the program would be defined by the Parliament of
Canada rather than by the provinces. The English version of the final
legal text also added the word "the" prior to "national objectives",
reflecting the view that the objectives must be linked to the particular
shared-cost program rather than to some more generic conception of
"national objectives".
Meech Lake Accord, s. 7.
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This wording reflected a clear compromise between the desire to
ensure that the federal government had the responsibility for defining
the national objectives, countered by a desire to ensure flexibility for
provincial governments in implementing those objectives. The clause
had been clarified to a considerable degree, but further attempts to
by the
clarify the clause were considered and found 2 unacceptable
6
government of Quebec at the Langevin meeting.
It is, of course, possible to denounce this relatively modest change
in wording as trivial or insufficient to deal with the public concerns
that had been expressed. The fact remains, however, that it was this
modest change in wording, in conjunction with various other modifications agreed to at the Langevin meeting, which permitted all governments to support the Accord. If the text were to be modified, even
slightly, then the compromise which constituted the basis of the agreement would also be altered and the intergovernmental consensus would
cease to exist.
This understanding of the significance of the final wording of the
constitutional resolution helps to explain why it was so difficult to
provide an opportunity for individual legislatures to consider amendments. Any amendments by individual legislatures, even those which
were apparently relatively minor, would alter the delicate balance
between competing interests reflected in the legal text. Moreover, there
is no mechanism for permitting the amendments proposed by individual
legislatures to form the basis for a new series of trade-offs that might
give rise to a new consensus. Each legislature considers amendments
on its own, in isolation from the legislatures and governments in other
provinces. There is no forum or process whereby the concerns or
objections of individual legislatures might be traded-off against one
another. The result is that opening the process to amendments by
individual legislatures would lead to an inevitable unravelling of any
agreement, as individual legislatures enacted amendments which met
the particular concerns of their constituents, without addressing the
concerns or perspectives of residents elsewhere. There was no "feedback loop" which would permit the concerns or objections of individual
provinces to be co-ordinated with each other so as to permit an
amendment to be successfully ratified.
The way in which this co-ordination problem was overcome was
to eliminate any possibility for individual legislatures to consider
possible amendments. Legislatures were asked to approve a single
constitutional resolution which had been agreed to by governments on

For example, it was proposed that there should be an explicit statement that
the "national objectives" would be defined by the Parliament of Canada rather than
the provinces. This proposal was unacceptable to Quebec, which was willing only to
include a reference to the program as being "established by the Governement of
Canada".
26
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a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis with no opportunity to consider even
apparently minor amendments. But this approach created a whole series
of subsidiary problems. Despite the legal requirement of eleven separate legislative votes on the constitutional resolution, there was no
meaningful opportunity to consider amendments, no matter how minor
or narrow they might appear to be. Even in a parliamentary system of
government with executive control of the legislature, there is normally
some scope for the legislature to modify proposals from the government. The absence of any such discretion in the consideration of a
constitutional resolution thus created an exceptional situation which
seemed an affront to normal democratic principles and procedure.
There was an obvious and very public contradiction between the
apparent and the real power of legislatures, a contradiction which
undermined the credibility of the process and fuelled a perception that
the whole exercise was little more than a sham. Particularly difficult
was that this inherent contradiction between the apparent and the real
role of individual legislators would be played out on eleven separate
occasions, with each repetition further discrediting the process in the
minds of the public.
In short, the 1982 rules for legislative ratification had created a
process without providing a mechanism to ensure that the process
could function effectively. The Constitution Act, 1982 had established
a formal legal role for individual legislators, but no provision had been
made to link legislative deliberations with the earlier discussions between governments, or with the deliberations of other legislatures. The
only place where trade-offs between competing positions could be
made was through discussions between First Ministers. But each First
Minister is linked only to a single legislature. This meant that each
legislature would play the role of a "rubber-stamp" for the decisions
and compromises made by First Ministers.
The absence of an effective "feedback loop" linking individual
legislatures with each other or with other governments represents a
serious design defect in the 1982 constitutional rules. The means
chosen to remedy the defect - essentially to deny any meaningful
role for legislatures - had the unintended consequence of undermining
public support for the process and the substance of the Accord. Thus
this particular feature of the 1982 amending formula represents one of
the key elements in any explanation as to why the Meech Lake Accord
failed.
B.

The Political Inheritance of 1982 Revisited: The Exclusion of
Quebec

Much has been written about the decision to proceed without the
consent of the government and National Assembly of Quebec in the
1982 round of discussions. Within the province of Quebec, the exclusion of Quebec has been portrayed as a monstrous betrayal of the
promises of "renewed federalism" made during the referendum cam-
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paign. Others, most notably former Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau,
argue that Quebec was excluded because its political leaders were
separatists who were unwilling to consider any reasonable 27accommodation with the other provinces or the federal government.
I want to put this debate to one side for a moment and consider
a second-order issue. This issue is whether or not the exclusion of
Quebec made it necessary to attempt to "bring Quebec back in" at
some subsequent point in time.
I take the view that, regardless of your attitude towards the events
of 1982, those events made it necessary to achieve some new accommodation with Quebec. This, in effect, was the price of the decision
to proceed over the objections of Quebec. The decision to proceed
may have been perfectly legal and consistent with constitutional convention, but it produced a political dynamic which could not be simply
ignored.
There are principled as well as pragmatic reasons supporting this
conclusion. In terms of political principle, a basic cornerstone of our
system of government is voluntary consent. The Quebec government,
even the government headed by Mr Bourassa in 1985, did not accept
the political legitimacy of the arrangements negotiated in 1982. Nor
would any future Quebec government, regardless of political stripe,
willingly accept the existing constitutional arrangements. Thus the
constitutional arrangements of 1982 lacked basic moral and political
legitimacy in the province of Quebec. This legitimacy could only be
conferred as a result of the willing consent of the government of
Quebec to the Canadian constitution.
There were pragmatic political considerations which also pointed
towards the same conclusion. Quebec nationalism was a latent force
in the mid-1980's, but it was certain that Quebec nationalist forces
would witness a resurgence at some point in the future. At that point,
the political illegitimacy of the 1982 settlement would only add fuel
to nationalist fires in the province. If the constitutional issue remained
unresolved, it would then constitute a political crisis of major proportions. Moreover, the refusal of Quebec to consent to the Constitution
Act, 1982 meant that the province refused to participate in any other
constitutional discussions. This meant that other constitutional amendments, such as those dealing with aboriginal rights or Senate Reform,
would be extremely difficult to secure. The significance of Quebec's
absence from the table was illustrated at the 1985 and 1987 First
Ministers' Conferences on Aboriginal rights, in which it proved impossible to secure the necessary consent from the other nine provinces
to successfully advance an amendment.
There were thus compelling reasons in favour of securing Quebec's willing consent to the Constitution Act, 1982. It should be noted
that there have been a few prominent dissenters from this view.

27

See, e.g., Gibbins, supra, note 7 at 121-22.
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Commentators such as the former Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau, have
argued that the consent of the Quebec government is simply unnecessary since the province is already legally bound by the 1982 Act.28
But it is significant that this argument about dispensing with Quebec's
consent is of recent vintage, appearing in the days following the
negotiation of the Meech Lake Accord. In the period prior to the
negotiations at Meech Lake, no one inside or outside the province of
Quebec was suggesting that Quebec's consent to the Constitution was
superfluous. In the two or three years leading up to the meeting of
April 30, 1987, there was virtual unanimity amongst both English and
French Canadian elite opinion that the events of 1982 required some
form of redress.
There are many examples of this consensus which could be
identified, but only a few will be noted here. The Macdonald Commission, in its comprehensive analysis of the future of Canadian
institutions published in 1985, concluded that it was necessary to seek
a "renewed understanding between Quebec and the rest of Canada". 29
The Commission proceeded to advance a series of concrete proposals
which might form the basis of this renewed understanding. At the
same time, political leaders in all parts of the country, and from all
political parties, adopted a similar view. This included the Prime
Minister and the leaders of the two major national opposition parties,
as well as the Premiers of all the provinces. Even those who were
later to become the most vigorous critics of the Meech Lake Accord
initially supported the attempt to reconcile Quebec to the Constitution.
For instance, the Toronto Star reacted to the proposals made by Minister
Rdmillard at Mont Gabriel in May of 1986 with the observation that
the Constitution lacked moral standing in the province of Quebec and
that "it behooves us to address Quebec's concerns". 30
The conclusion which flows from this analysis is that the constitutional amendments of 1982 were achieved with a price attached.
That price was the negotiation of a subsequent accommodation with
the duly elected government of Quebec. The decision to proceed
unilaterally in 1982 made it essential that there be some attempt to
"bring Quebec back in" to the Constitution. If this observation is

28

See P.E. Trudeau, Say Goodbye to the Dream of One Canada in Gibbins,

ed., supra, note 2, 65 at 69-70.
29 Canada, Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada,

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(Ottawa:

Supply and Services Canada, 1985) at 53 (Chairperson: D.S. MacDonald).
30 "Quebec's Turn on Constitution" The Toronto Star (9 August 1986) B2. See
also P.M. Leslie, REBUILDING THE RELATIONSHIP: QUEBEC AND ITS CONFEDERATION

(Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen's University,
1987) at 6, who reports that a consensus existed amongst those who had participated

PARTNERS

in the 1980-82 round that there should be an attempt to secure Quebec's consent to

the Constitution.
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correct, then there are at least six additional conclusions which necessarily follow:
1) Any such negotiations would necessarily be highly symbolic
and politically charged.
Symbolism is an inherent part of all constitutional negotiations,
since changes to a constitution always implicate intangible, symbolic
considerations. As has often been pointed out, it is for this reason that
constitutional negotiations are notoriously difficult to resolve successfully. 3' But any negotiations structured around an attempt to "bring
Quebec back in" to the Constitution would have a heightened sense
of symbolism attached to them. Part of the explanation for this heightened symbolism lies in the collective memory of the events of 1982
themselves. Within Quebec, these events had been portrayed as a
"betrayal" of Quebec by the rest of Canada. This perception of 1982
may not have been widely shared amongst English Canadians. But the
mere fact that English Canadian political leaders conceded that a
"Quebec round" was necessary constituted an implicit admission of
the legitimacy of Quebecer's views on this issue. Thus the issuance of
the Edmonton Declaration32 of 1986 calling for a "Quebec round"
reinforced within Quebec the idea that the province had suffered a
"wrong" in 1982.
2) This meant that the Meech Lake negotiations would only
ostensibly be about dry constitutional texts. The real subject matter of
the discussions, at least in the province of Quebec, would be about
"honour".

Quebec, finding itself betrayed, now sought to restore its dignity
and honour. The only question for Quebecers was whether English
Canadians were prepared to make amends for the events of 1982. The
centrality of the idea of honour is reflected throughout the process.
Prime Minister Mulroney, in his famous Sept-Iles speech of August
1984, framed the issue in terms of Quebec accepting the 1982 Constitution with "honour and enthusiasm". 33 Minister R~millard announced Quebec's "five conditions" in a speech entitled: Nothing Less

31 See M.B. Stein, CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL RENEWAL, 1968-8 1: A CASE
STUDY IN INTEGRATIVE BARGAINING (Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen's University, 1989) at 8. Stein notes that symbolic intangible goods are
difficult to negotiate because they are not readily quantifiable and divisable and thus,
not susceptible to distributive solutions and bargaining compromise.
32 Twenty-Seventh Annual Premiers' Conference, The Edmonton Declaration,
Document No. 850-34/009 (Edmonton, 10-12 August 1986).
33 See B. Mulroney, "Annex" in Canada, FEDERAL STATEMENTS IN THE QUEBEC
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE (Ottawa: Office of the Prime Minister, 1987) 1 at 1, for
reproduction of extracts from the speech of August 6, 1984.
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than Quebec's Dignity Is At Stake In Future Constitutional Discussions24 In the main body of the speech, after enunciating the five
conditions, Minister R6millard summarized his presentation by noting
that "[what] we are asking for [is] the respect of the dignity and pride35
of the people of Quebec and respect of the province's historic rights".
This emphasis on considerations of honour and dignity ran very deep
throughout these discussions in the province of Quebec, exemplified
by Premier Bourassa's declaration in early 1990 that Quebec refused
to re-enter Confederation "on our knees".
3) While the substance of the negotiations would be important,
of equal if not greater importance was the form or publicface of these
negotiations.
Given the centrality of considerations of "honour", any negotiations must be seen as restoring the dignity and honour of Quebec. If
Quebec was seen to be dishonoured in any way, either in terms of
process or outcome, then the negotiations would end in failure. The
result would be a further alienation of Quebec from the rest of Canada
and a resurgence of radical nationalism in the province of Quebec.
4) Quebec's political leaders could not be seen to be making
concessions to the rest of Canada.
Quebec had stated its five conditions for re-entry into the Canadian
constitutional family. There could be no question of Quebec "backing
down" or modifying its demands to accommodate concerns in other
parts of the country. Any such move to "back down" would constitute
a loss of face and negate the symbolic purpose of the negotiations
the restoration of the honour and dignity of Quebec.
-

5) Failure in the negotiations had to be avoided at all costs, as
it would be seen as a rejection of Quebec and of Quebec's "historic
rights".
A failure to conclude an agreement would mean that the rest of
the country had rejected a series of minimal and legitimate demands
from Quebec. English Canada would have proven itself unwilling to
provide redress for the events of the early 1980's. Thus the decision
to commence negotiations was a fateful one, since it was imperative
that they result in a satisfactory agreement. It should be emphasized
that this requirement that the negotiations produce a negotiated solution
was a unique feature of the Meech Lake negotiations. Canadians had
been discussing the Constitution off and on for about 60 years. But

34 (Address to a conference, Mont Gabriel, Quebec, 9-11 May 1986) in Leslie,
supra, note 30, 39 at 42.
35 Ibid. at 47.
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these various negotiations had never been conducted against the backdrop of serious political instability in the event the negotiations failed.
Political leaders in previous settings had always been free to leave the
constitutional table without reaching agreement, secure in the knowledge that such a result would not imperil the future of the country. In
the Meech round, a new and unprecedented set of ground rules came
into play, ground rules which made a negotiated agreement virtually
mandatory.
6) In the event that an agreement to "bring Quebec in" was
negotiated, there would be no scope for Quebec political leaders to
agree to subsequent modifications.
Any further concessions after the signing of an agreement would
be seen within Quebec as "backing down" in the face of pressure
from English Canada. Thus it was absolutely essential that Quebec
political leaders not make any further compromises once an agreement
had been signed. In fact, it would be preferable for Quebec leaders to
allow a negotiated agreement to lapse rather than to make concessions
in the hope that the agreement might be ratified. While non-ratification
of an agreement would give rise to serious negative consequences, the
implications of "amending" the agreement were arguably even more
serious. The making of such concessions would constitute a fatal "loss
of face", in which Quebec would be seen to be negotiating "on its
knees". This would be a contradiction of the symbolic purpose of the
negotiations and produce a profound political destabilization in Quebec.
All of these six conclusions highlight the extremely limited flexibility available to Quebec's political leaders. Whatever minimal flexibility they did possess was at its high point in the early stages of the
negotiations. The longer the negotiations continued, the more limited
was their room for manoeuvre. A long and protracted series of negotiations would give rise to the impression within Quebec that the rest
of Canada was unwilling to meet their "minimal demands". The
negotiations would have to be relatively short and smooth if the
outcome was to be successful.
As for political leaders in English Canada, their flexibility in the
negotiations was only marginally greater than that possessed by Quebec. For one thing, the perceptions within English Canada of the events
of 1981-82 were the mirror image of those held in Quebec. The
referendum and the 1982 constitutional settlement were seen as a just
resolution of outstanding constitutional claims, one which established
a "creative equilibrium between the provinces and the central government ... set to last a thousand years". 36 Outside of Quebec, the failure
of the Quebec government to accept the Constitution Act, 1982 was
attributed more to the presence of a separatist government in Quebec

36

Trudeau, supra, note 28 at 71.
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City than to any inherent injustice in the process or its result. 37 There
was little support outside of Quebec for the view that Quebec had
legitimate grievances as a result of the 1982 constitutional discussions.
This meant that there was limited tolerance in the rest of the country
for significant concessions to Quebec to "make amends" for the events
of November 5, 1981.
A second complicating factor within English Canada was an
emerging political ideology in favour of the "equality of the provinces".
If the idea of "special status" had been the rallying cry for Quebec
nationalists, the idea of provincial equality had been an equally powerful organizing principle for the rest of the country. The former Prime
Minister, Pierre Trudeau, had resisted Quebec's claims for "particular
status" on the basis that it violated the essence of the federal principle
itself. The claim that all provinces were juridically equal had been
advanced vigorously by the western provinces in the constitutional
discussions of the late 1970's. By the mid-1980's, there was a widespread political constituency in English Canada committed to the idea
that provincial equality was "inherent" in the idea of federalism itself.
Any attempt to tamper with the equality principle would be characterized as an attack on the very bedrock of Canadian federalism.
A third factor limiting the flexibility of English Canadian political
leaders was the changing demographic characteristics of the country.
Prior to the Second World War, the Canadian population had been
dominated by persons of either British or French descent. Thus the
central task of political institutions up to that time had been the attempt
to reconcile the competing claims of these two "founding peoples".
But in the years following 1945, Canada has become increasingly
multicultural and multiracial as the British and French elements of the
population have declined dramatically. By 1981 the "other" - nonBritish and non-French - had passed the French component and is
now nearly one third of the population. By the first half of the twentyfirst century the "other" could be the single largest element of the
population. 38
These trends have profound implications for politics in this country at both a substantive and symbolic level.39 In terms of symbolism,
these developments represent a head-on challenge to political activity
structured around the axis of French-English relations. Yet it was this

37 See, e.g., B. Schwartz, FATHOMING MEECH LAKE (Winnipeg: Legal Research

Institute, University of Manitoba, 1987) at 205-14.
38

See A.C. Cairns, PoliticalScience, Ethnicity and the CanadianConstitution

in D.P. Shugarman & R. Whitaker, eds,
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF DONALD SMILEY

FEDERALISM AND POLITICAL COMMUNITY:

(Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1989) 113

at 121.
39 See R. Breton, The Production and Allocation of Symbolic Resources: An
Analysis of the Linguistic and EthnoculturalFields in Canada (1984) 21 CAN. REV.
OF SOCIOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY 123.
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very axis which was at the heart of the Meech Lake negotiations. The
challenge for English-Canadian leaders would be to resolve the issue
of Quebec's place in Confederation without appearing to assert the
primacy of French-English relations. One hesitates to suggest that such
a task verges on the impossible, but it is certainly a formidable
challenge for which there is no obvious or uncontroversial solution.
C.

Making Meech: From Mont Gabriel to Union Station

It is becoming increasingly commonplace to conclude that the
Meech Lake Accord failed because of "political bungling," but my
argument thus far has been designed to show how the negotiations
were confronted by a series of very formidable legal and political
obstacles. These obstacles included an unwieldy and rigid amending
formula; issues which were highly symbolic and thus not readily
amenable to compromise; and political forces which reduced the flexibility of the negotiators on both sides and limited their ability to make
concessions.
Far from an exercise in political bungling, the Meech process was
an attempt to overcome these challenges and constraints. I will not
attempt here to provide a full account of the negotiations which began
in the summer of 1986 and concluded in the week-long marathon
session in the Ottawa train station 4o this past June. 41 Instead, I want to
focus very briefly on three of the major critiques which have been
levelled against the Meech process and consider these criticisms in
light of the factors I have identified.
1.

Critique One: Meech Was Bungled Because it Focused
Exclusively on the Concerns of the Province of Quebec

This is one of the often-repeated explanations as to why the
Meech Lake Accord failed. It is said that the focus on the concerns
of the province of Quebec led to the "exclusion" of other groups,
such as aboriginals, women and ethnocultural Canadians. These groups,
it is said, were sympathetic to the concerns of the province of Quebec.
Their objection was that Quebec's agenda was being considered in
isolation from their constitutional grievances.
This argument ignores one of the key constraints on the Meech
negotiations, the rule requiring unanimous consent of all provincial
governments. As earlier indicated, this decision rule makes negotiated
solutions extremely difficult because it grants each party to the negotiations a veto and enables them to hold out until their particular

4 The Ottawa Conference Centre, where the June 1990 meetings were held,

was originally "Union Station", Ottawa's train depot until 1966.
41 I will provide such a detailed account in a forthcoming book,

MEECH LAKE:
THE INSIDE STORY (to be published by University of Toronto Press, 1991).
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agenda has been satisfied. It also encourages parties to the negotiations
to attempt to link the negotiations with other extraneous concerns.
The presence of the unanimity rule made it essential that the
subject-matter of the negotiations be limited in advance. Unless some
limiting ground rules were established, it would be virtually impossible
to reach a negotiated solution. The unanimity rule meant that the list
of items under negotiation would continually and inexorably expand,
making any comprehensive settlement simply unattainable. This, of
course, is what did happen anyway, despite the decision to restrict the
agenda to the five conditions identified by Quebec. Alberta and Newfoundland added the issues of "Senate Reform" and "Fisheries" to
the agenda and required that they be addressed. But given the Edmonton Declaration,42 these provinces were prepared to accept that their
concerns would only be addressed in a preliminary fashion in the
Meech Lake Accord itself. They were prepared to concede that a
comprehensive settlement of their outstanding claims would have to
await a second round of negotiations. In short, it can be said that the
decision to restrict the agenda to a limited number of items was an
essential precondition to any negotiated settlement. Had the negotiations been conducted on the footing that any and all outstanding claims
would be satisfied, unanimous agreement would have proven simply
impossible.
2.

Critique Two: Meech Was Bungled Because it Gave Premier
Bourassa More Than He Asked For

This is another frequent criticism of the Meech process, focusing
on the differences between the original "five conditions" and the terms
of the Meech Lake Accord itself. According to this critique, the original
five conditions were reasonable and moderate. The problem is that the
Meech Lake Accord went beyond the "five conditions": instead of
recognizing the distinct society of Quebec in a preamble, the Accord
inserted it in the main body of the Constitution; it granted the special
powers claimed by Quebec to all the provinces rather than to Quebec
exclusively; and, it addressed other matters which were never included
in Quebec's demands and which were raised only at the last minute
by other provinces.
Certain aspects of this critique are based on a simple misapprehension of how the negotiations proceeded. For example, there has
been a great deal of criticism of the fact that the "distinct society"
clause was included in the main body of the Constitution rather than
a preamble. But it is important to observe that the May 1986 speech
by Minister R6millard referred to the need to recognize the distinct43
identity of Quebec without specifying where this clause would appear.
42 Supra, note 32.
43 R6millard, supra, note 34 at 42-43.
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By the fall of 1986, the government of Quebec had tabled with the
federal government and with each of the provinces a proposed constitutional "text" reflecting the five conditions. The Quebec constitutional
proposals specified that the recognition of the distinct identity of
Quebec would be included in the main body of the Constitution. Other
governments accepted this principle and the negotiations leading up to
April 30, 1987 were largely focused on the precise wording of such a
clause rather than its location. Thus it is simply factually incorrect to
claim that the distinct society clause went beyond what Premier Bourassa himself had requested.
The other problem with this critique is that it ignores the fact
that the "five conditions" outlined in May of 1986 were only a starting
point for the negotiations. It was inevitable that there would be
significant differences between this starting point and the eventual
outcome of the negotiations. More importantly, the changes that were
agreed to were not the result of a lack of "political will" or the
product of bungling, but simply a response to the constraints I have
earlier identified. Matters such as Senate Reform and Fisheries were
added to the agenda because each province possessed a veto over the
negotiations. Similarly, the gains made by Quebec were extended to
all other provinces in order to secure their consent for the package.
This was the only approach which satisfied Quebec's demands while
not offending the "equality of the provinces" principle. In the absence
of these modifications, the original "five conditions" could simply not
have formed the basis of a unanimous agreement.
3.

Critique Three: Meech Was Bungled Because the Process
Was Undemocratic

The attack on the Meech Lake process is perhaps the most
frequently voiced and vehement criticism of the Quebec round. As
noted above, the critique has two distinct components. First, it is noted
that the negotiations which produced the Accord were conducted
entirely in private with no opportunity for public input. Second, once
the Accord was negotiated, governments refused to entertain any
modifications or changes to its terms.
It is beyond dispute that the entire Meech process was conducted
behind closed doors, involving only the First Ministers and their
advisors. It should also be acknowledged that the secrecy surrounding
the process was exceptional, with far fewer opportunities for public
discussion and input than had been the case in previous constitutional
discussions. For example, prior to the meeting of April 30, 1987, no
government had even publicly conceded that negotiations on Quebec's
five conditions had in fact begun. The meeting of April 30 was
described by the Prime Minister and by Senator Murray 44 as an
-4 Lowell Murray, Conservative Senator for Grenville-Carleton, Minister of
State for Federal-Provincial Relations and Government Leader in the Senate.
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"exploratory meeting" to determine whether negotiations should commence, rather than a "formal negotiating meeting". 45 Then, when an
agreement was announced, all governments were united in their unwillingness to consider substantive changes.
These elements of the critique of the Meech process are obviously
correct. The more difficult and interesting question is, what is the
explanation for the secretive and inflexible approach which was adopted
throughout the Meech negotiations? It is in responding to this question
that the critique of the process begins to break down.
Popular criticism of the Accord tends to blame errant and misguided political leadership for conducting the process in a manner
which doomed it to failure. The reality is precisely the opposite of this
popular image. The Meech Lake Accord was negotiated behind closed
doors because this was the only approach which stood any chance of
succeeding. A more public process stood virtually no prospect of
resulting in a unanimous agreement on Quebec's five conditions.
Consider the prospects for resolving Quebec's five conditions as
they appeared in the summer of 1986. The government of Quebec had
proposed a reasonable set of conditions for acceptance of the Canadian
Constitution, but translating those five general principles into the basis
for a unanimous agreement between governments was still a long shot.
The sobering fact was that, in over 60 years of constitutional negotiations, there had never been unanimous agreement on Quebec's place
in Confederation. The Constitution was a "genie in a corked bottle". 46
Once the bottle was uncorked, there was a danger that the genie would
"grow to unpredictable proportions, or become unmanageable". 47
Thus as early as the Mont Gabriel conference in May 1986, there
was already an emerging consensus as to the strategy that would be
necessary in order to secure Quebec's adherence to the Constitution.
The Report of the Mont Gabriel Conference, published early in 1987,
clearly outlined the elements of this strategy. First, the agenda must
be limited to the five conditions outlined by Mr R6millard. Second,
"a preliminary set of informal discussions must take place behind
closed doors" in order to identify whether a consensus was possible. 48
Only when such a consensus was identified should the negotiations
enter a public phase.
The working assumption underlying this approach was that the
Quebec government would find it very difficult to retreat from a specific
proposal once that proposal was publicly known. Thus by conducting
"informal negotiations" on a private basis, Quebec gained a measure
of flexibility in the negotiations which a public discussion would have

45 P. Poirier & M. Fisher, "PM Invites 10 Premiers to Discuss Quebec
Constitutional Proposals" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (18 March 1987) A3.
46 Leslie, supra, note 30 at 33.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.

at 33-34.
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precluded. The description of the initial discussions as "exploratory"
rather than as "formal negotiations" also reflected an attempt by the
Quebec government to preserve the option of walking away from the
negotiation table without the risk of significant political instability.
This strategy "worked", at least in the sense that it permitted all
governments to reach a unanimous agreement on Quebec's five conditions. Quebec officials conducted two cross-country tours of provincial capitals in the summer and fall of 1986 in order to gauge reaction
to their proposals. In presenting their proposals, Quebec officials
stressed that they were "working documents" only and that they were
willing to entertain modifications in the interests of achieving consensus. Through a process of give and take, the proposals were modified
until a consensus began to emerge in March and April of 1987. But
the Quebec officials stressed that the moment the substance of the
negotiations became public, all their flexibility would instantly disappear. Thus a successful outcome was entirely dependent on the ability
to conduct the negotiations on a private and confidential basis.
Once an agreement was negotiated, it was impossible for the
government of Quebec to agree to any substantive amendments. The
reasons for this have been outlined earlier: any modifications to the
Accord would be interpreted within Quebec as "backing down" in the
face of pressure from English Canada. The ratification phase was
subject to a classic zero-sum dynamic. Quebec having determined its
"minimal conditions", the only remaining issue was the willingness of
the rest of English Canada to meet these conditions. There was
absolutely no possibility of the Accord being amended after June 1987,
and being re-ratified by the province of Quebec.
The impossibility of amending the Accord to take account of the
concerns of English Canada was illustrated by the experience of the
Charest Committee in early 1990. After insisting for nearly three years
that the terms of the Accord were a "seamless web", the government
of Canada altered its stance and agreed to the appointment of the
Charest Committee in April 1990. The mandate of the Charest Committee was to make recommendations regarding a companion resoluhave in effect amounted to amendments to the
tion, which would
49
original Accord.
The change in approach was initially hailed as a breakthrough in
the ratification process, with groups outside of Quebec congratulating
the government for its willingess to finally consider substantive amendments. The Committee duly conducted public hearings and developed
a package of proposals which would have met some of the concerns
expressed by opponents of the Meech Lake Accord. But the difficulty

49
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THE PROPOSED COMPANION

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY
RESOLUTION TO THE MEECH LAKE ACCORD (Ottawa:

Supply and Services Canada, 1990) at 1 (Chairperson: J. Charest).

1990]

After Meech Lake

with the new approach was instantly revealed by the reaction of the
government of Quebec to the proposals. The proposals were denounced
within Quebec as a "humiliation" and an attempt to convert the Quebec
round into a "Canada round". Nationalist critics in Quebec pointed to
the sheer number of the recommendations in the Charest report as
evidence of the fact that the gains which Quebec had secured in the
original Accord were being threatened. Following the resignation of
the federal government's chief political minister for Quebec,50 Premier
Bourassa pronounced the proposals to be "unacceptable" to the government of Quebec. Reflecting the zero-sum dynamic of the negotiations, Premier Bourassa insisted that no changes were possible to the
distinct society clause, even changes which could be described as mere
"clarifications" of the original and agreed meaning of the clause.
The Charest Committee episode was one of the most revealing
of the entire Meech process. The Committee proposals were a classic
attempt to achieve a compromise which succeeded in satisfying no
one. While the proposed amendments were seen as "humiliation" in
Quebec, for English Canadian critics of the Accord, such as Newfoundland Premier Clyde Wells or Manitoba Premier Gary Filmon, the
problem with the proposals was that they did not go far enough.
Arguably, the federal government's decision to strike the Committee
complicated the whole process and made prospects of ratification even
more remote. By proposing substantive amendments to the Accord,
the Committee reinforced an impression held by many English Canadians that amendments were still possible in the spring of 1990. This
hope was a false one, but it was widely and tenaciously held. It took
six days and nights in the Ottawa railway station to finally convince
Manitoba Premier Gary Filmon, Sharon Carstairs (Manitoba Liberal
Party Leader and Leader of the Opposition), Gary Doer (Manitoba
N.D.P. Leader) and Newfoundland Premier Clyde Wells, of the true
nature of the choice they had to make.
D.

The Failure of Meech Lake: A Reassessment

When Canadian political leaders began negotiations aimed at
securing Quebec's willing acceptance of the Constitution Act, 1982,
most commentators agreed that the time was ripe for a successful
outcome. By the summer of 1986, all the elements necessary for a
resolution of Quebec's historic claims for a renewed federalism seemed
to have fallen into place: a federalist government had been elected in
Quebec on the basis of five relatively modest "conditions"; the nationalist fires in Quebec had cooled following the referendum and constitutional debates of the early 1980's; the government in Ottawa was

50 Lucien Bouchard, Member of Parliament for Lac-Saint-Jean and former
Minister of the Environment.
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committed to securing the signature of the Quebec government on the
Constitution; and, the Premiers of the other nine provinces had all
agreed to put aside their own concerns and focus exclusively on a
"Quebec round" of negotiations as a priority matter. Yet, despite these
positive indications, the negotiations ended in stalemate and the country
was left more divided and embittered than it had been in many years.
Understanding what went wrong and how, if at all, it might be fixed,
becomes a matter of some urgency. For if we were unable to resolve
the "Quebec question" in the relatively tranquil atmosphere of 1986,
what prospects are there for finding a solution in the much more
threatening political climate of 1990?
The first lesson of the Meech process is that, despite the apparent
tranquility prevailing in 1986, there were a series of unnoticed but
very significant obstacles standing in the way of a successful resolution.
The Meech Lake discussions were conducted in the context of contradictory structural constraints and imperatives, each of them pulling in
precisely opposite directions. These structural factors channelled and
conditioned the choices made by political leaders, and established the
framework within which those choices would be debated and assessed
by the public. Together, these structural factors made the achievement
of an agreement extremely difficult and ensured that any agreement
would be fragile and easily unravelled.
The first structural imperative was the formal decision rules for
constitutional change which had been established in 1982. These
decision rules subjected the process to a series of rigid formalities
which made the achievement of a constitutional amendment extremely
difficult. All provinces were granted a veto over significant constitutional changes, including changes sought by the province of Quebec.
Furthermore, the amending formula did not simply require the agreement of governments, as had been the case prior to 1982, but required
identical constitutional resolutions passed by eleven legislatures. However, while the amending formula required legislative resolutions, there
was no effective mechanism or forum for linking the deliberations of
individual legislatures with each other. The only mechanism for making
the trade-offs necessary to achieve the required level of consensus was
an intergovernmental agreement. Previous experience had shown that
even achieving a consensus amongst governments was difficult; since
1940, there had been unanimous intergovernmental agreement on only
three relatively minor constitutional amendments. 51 Now, for the first
time, it would be necessary to arrive at an agreement that would be
acceptable to all governments, and then to secure the ratification of
that agreement in precisely identical terms in eleven legislatures.
The exclusion of Quebec from the 1982 constitutional settlement
provided the focus of the negotiations. Some regarded the "single51 See P.W. Hogg, CONSTITUTIONAL
swell Co., 1985) at 340 n. 159.
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issue" character of the discussions as a positive sign, suggesting that
the agenda would be manageable and, therefore, susceptible to an
agreement. But again, this single-issue focus for the negotiations had
serious downsides in terms of achieving a positive resolution. The
focus on a single-issue made it more difficult to achieve the trade-offs
necessary to secure agreement. It also increased the likelihood that
any agreement would be viewed in "zero-sum" terms with easily
identifiable winners and losers.
All of these factors reduced flexibility and possibilities for compromise, favoured private negotiations between governments over public debate of the issues, and limited the ability to permit amendments
in the event that governments were able to reach agreement. At the
same time, however, a participatory political culture reflected in the
Charter claimed that a process dominated by governments was an
unacceptable basis for constitutional amendment. The three year time
period and the need for legislative ratification provided multiple veto
points where the amendment could be blocked by its opponents.
Furthermore, the creation of a formal role for individual legislators
without any meaningful opportunity to influence the final outcome
fuelled public cynicism and opposition to the Accord.
The process and the substance of the Meech Lake Accord responded to some of these pressures and imperatives but ignored others.
Governments were able to overcome the obstacles standing in the way
of achieving an initial unanimous agreement, but, in overcoming these
obstacles, they failed to take account of the need to provide for
meaningful public input into the process.
By the mid-1980's, the legitimacy of elite accommodation as a
basis for amending the Constitution had eroded dramatically. There
had been a fundamental shift in our constitutional culture, a shift in
which government domination of the constitutional amending process
had come to be seen as "arrogant elitism". 52 This shift in constitutional
culture was by no means an isolated phenomenon; it was consistent
with a growing trend, beginning in the 1960's, to reject traditional
values and the presumed authority of political leaders. The current
generation of Canadians has begun to question traditional deference to
authority and hierarchy, while asserting individualistic values, a willingness to experiment with new ideas and a rejection of traditional
roles.53 The enactment of the Charter in the early 1980's was perfectly
consistent with this emphasis on individualistic values and the need to
feel personally in control of one's own life. The Charter was seen as

52See, e.g., Cairns, supra, notes 9 and 38, for an eloquent elaboration of this

shift.
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a tool whereby groups once relegated to the periphery - such as
native peoples, women, ethnic minorities, the disabled or the elderly
- could discover a political voice and assert their autonomy and
demand for social justice within the wider society. The enactment of
the Charter was thus a reflection of and a further impetus to a political
consciousness founded on a defence of individual rights.
This rights consciousness rejected the values of deference associated with Parliamentary sovereignty and saw the courts rather than
political leaders as the primary defenders of individual liberty. Moreover, having tasted limited success in the 1981 amendment process,
women's groups, aboriginals and others had awakened to their very
significant ability to influence and to alter constitutional agreements
signed by governments. They had come to regard the Constitution as
"of the people" rather than simply as an affair for governments and
political elites. These groups have quickly come to constitute what
Cairns and others have termed "Charter Canadians", 54 dedicated to
vigorously resisting any attempt by governments to threaten or erode
their hard earned pride of place in the constitutional order.
These groups focused their attack on the "distinct society" clause
and the potential threat it posed to Charter rights, insisting that the
Accord be amended to secure the primacy of the Charter. There was
a paradoxical quality to the attack on the distinct society clause.
Whatever its potential effect, the clause clearly constituted a less
serious encroachment on individual rights than the notwithstanding
clause 55 which had been accepted in 1982.56 Moreover, the distinct
society clause paralleled a similar clause referring to multiculturalism
found in the Charter57 itself. These elements of the 1982 Constitution
were far greater potential threats to individual rights than anything in
the distinct society clause, yet they had been agreed to with relatively
little fuss. This simply underscored the fact that the trouble with the
distinct society clause was the symbolic messages it contained and
transmitted. The undemocratic nature of the process whereby the
Meech Lake Accord had been negotiated was a symbol of the primacy
of governments and elected political leaders in constitutional change.
And the reference to the "distinct identity" of Quebec symbolized a
politics in which French-English relations were regarded as primary.
These symbolic messages were regarded as anachronistic at best and
downright offensive at worst by many of the critics of the Accord.
It is impossible to identify any single "cause" or isolated event
which single-handedly accounts for the failure of the Meech Lake

- Cairns, supra, note 9 at 116.
55 Charter, s. 33.

56 See, e.g., C. Wells, "Open Letter From Clyde Wells to the Right Honourable
Brian Mulroney" (18 October 1989) for an eloquent critique of the clause.
57 S. 27.
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Accord. But perhaps the best way of explaining the failure of the
Accord is to say that it fell victim to the very circumstances which
compelled its creation. The exclusion of Quebec in 1982 made it
necessary to undertake a "Quebec round" of negotiations, but the
amending formula which governed the process was cumbersome and
inflexible. It made it necessary to resort to a process which undermined
the credibility of the final product. As the uncertainty dragged on,
public sympathy within English Canada for the very idea of a "Quebec
round" eroded dramatically.
This is not to suggest that failure was by any means inevitable.
Indeed, despite the numerous obstacles I have outlined, an agreement
was reached between eleven governments in April of 1987 and very
nearly enacted into law. Had certain events unfolded in a slightly
different fashion, one can imagine the Accord having been ratified and
the debate having been resolved. But, while failure was not inevitable,
there are at least two sobering conclusions which flow from this
analysis. The first is that the failure of the Accord cannot be attributed
simply to a failure of political leadership. There were certain structural
imperatives, imperatives which flowed out of the 1982 constitutional
settlement, which played a key role in the Accord's eventual demise.
There is no reason to believe that a simple change in political personalities will, by itself, enhance the prospects for success in any future
negotiations over Quebec's place in Canada.
Many critics have argued that a more participatory and open
process would have resulted in a unanimous agreement which would
have been ratified. These critics claim that there was widespread
acceptance of Quebec's "five conditions" and that there was a basis
for consensus if the political leaders had proceeded in a more democratic fashion. The analysis in this paper, however, suggests that there
is little basis for supposing that a more democratic process, in itself,
would have improved the prospects for success. It is certainly correct
that a more open, participatory process would have responded to some
of the overriding constraints which were present during the Meech
round - those related to the need for public participation. But this
approach, although certainly inherently desirable, would not have dealt
with any of the other contradictory pressures which structured the
negotiations. In particular, it would not have provided any mechanism
for securing the required unanimous agreement between governments
or for overcoming the "single-issue" character of the negotiations. Nor
would it have provided a bridging mechanism which would have coordinated the deliberations of individual legislatures following an agreement between governments.
The broader implication of this analysis is that, if the outcome
of any future discussions are to be different, a mere change in political
leadership will be insufficient. Nor will a more open and democratic
approach to constitutional amendment, a change that is self-evidently
desirable, lead to a more successful outcome. Nor, indeed, will a mere
reworking or "improvement" of the contents of the Meech Lake

Ottawa Law Review/Revue de droit d'Ottawa

[Vol. 22:2

Accord permit a resolution of these issues. The results will only change
when the decision rules and the other structural constraints limiting
the process are subject to scrutiny and change. But the likelihood of
this happening are, at best, fairly minimal.
The debate over the Meech Lake Accord unleashed deep and
important passions about the nature of Canadian society. The Meech
Lake debate was above all a struggle for political legitimacy between
competing interests and visions of our society. The death of the Accord
may have temporarily quelled this symbolic struggle, but it has certainly not finally resolved it, as the events of this past summer have
demonstrated. Canada now faces the uncertain prospect of having to
rediscover its own identity and place in the world at a time when our
sense of common purpose seems a distant and near-forgotten memory
from some earlier era.
III. AFrER MEACH LAKE: CANADA'S UNCERTAIN CONSTITUTIONAL
FUTURE

Canadians are now picking their way through the wreckage of
the Meech Lake negotiations, licking their wounds and preparing for
a new round of constitutional negotiations. The challenges are formidable. The first challenge, of course, is simply the fallout from the
failure of the Meech Lake Accord itself. The failure to ratify the
Accord has contributed to an upsurge of nationalist sentiment in
Quebec, with opinion polls indicating that support for sovereigntyassociation is at an all-time high of 60 per cent. Outside Quebec, on
the other hand, there is a widely-held perception that Quebec receives
more than its "fair share" from federalism and there is continuing
resentment over Quebec's sign law. 58 This suggests that the symbolic
struggle which dominated Meech Lake is likely to figure prominently
in any future discussions, with claims for "distinct status" confronted
with a unwavering commitment to "equality of the provinces". No one
has yet found the way to square the circle represented by these
competing ideological visions and no one, after Meech Lake, would
want to underestimate the challenge which this involves.
At the same time, the decision rules which govern constitutional
amendments, rules which have shown themselves to be extremely
cumbersome, are unlikely to be changed significantly in the future.
Any change in the amending formula requires the unanimous consent
of all governments. While certain governments might be willing to
entertain changes in the amending formula, it is unrealistic and out of
the question to suppose that all governments would be persuaded of
the merits of such changes.
The matter is further complicated by the fact that the amending
formula has proven itself to be a political anachronism in the Canada
51 See Adams & Lennon, supra, note 53.
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of the 1990's. The existing amending formula is premised on the
legitimacy of political leaders as opposed to the people themselves
determining future constitutional change. The Constitution Act, 1982
provides a role for governments and for legislatures but no explicit
basis for popular participation. The Meech Lake Accord has demonstrated, however, that this approach to constitutional decision-making
is no longer tenable. An amending formula premised on executive
federalism and elite accommodation is an anachronism in a society
which values equality and popular participation in political choices.
Yet no one has suggested how the process might be made more
participatory and transparent without rendering it totally unworkable.
The constitutional issue is complicated by a variety of other nonconstitutional factors. The flow of trade in Canada is becoming increasingly north-south, rather than east-west, a trend that is exemplified
by THE CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT. 59 The primacy of
north-south trade relationships means that the economic well-being of
any one part of the country is no longer dependant on other parts of
the country. This makes it more difficult to justify truly national
economic policy and erodes the commitment to regional sharing and
redistribution of income along east-west lines.
Internationally, one observes a movement towards the harmonization of economic policy in larger and larger trade blocs coupled with
a drive towards decentralization of community and political attachments. The trend towards economic harmonization reflects the globalization of world markets, a trend which diminishes the traditional
sovereignty of the nation-state and its capacity to protect domestic
consumers and producers from the grinding forces of international
competition. In this context, nation states, such as Canada, with no
overriding cultural, racial or linguistic ties can expect their legitimacy
and role to come into question. Moreover, this challenge comes at a
particularly difficult time for Canada, as the fiscal incapacity of the
federal government has already severely diminished its ability to play
a positive and unifying national role.
While the challenges are very great, and should not be underestimated, there is no basis for supposing that they are necessarily
insurmountable. The Meech Lake experience can serve a positive
function by indicating where our difficulties are likely to be found and
how we might overcome them.
I want to offer thirteen generalizations about the future round of
discussions on the Constitution. I will offer these generalizations in a
fairly summary and conclusory fashion, since they flow out of the
analysis which has been presented thus far.

59 (Ottawa: External Affairs, 10 December 1987).
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1) The chances of securing a formal constitutional amendment
under the general amending formula in the Constitution Act, 1982 are
virtually nil - at least in the short term.
If the Meech Lake experience has taught us anything, it is the
difficulty of obtaining a constitutional amendment under the existing
amending formula. Furthermore, the Meech process was undertaken in
an atmosphere of relative calm. This initial political tranquility provided a breathing space within which political trade-offs could be made
and a comprehensive package put together. The political context in
1990 is obviously a world apart from what it was in 1986; the relative
calm of just four years ago has been overwhelmed by a mood of
bitterness and rancour resulting from the failure of the Meech Lake
Accord. This sour political mood means that any future constitutional
negotiations would be even more dominated by symbolism and by
attempts to gain redress for past grievances. As Meech itself has
demonstrated, any series of negotiations conducted on such a footing
are unlikely to succeed.
The fundamental problem in the future round of discussions will
be how to accommodate the claims of Quebec for some "particular
status" within the federation. It is a certainty that the Quebec Parliamentary Commission will produce recommendations which require
some formal recognition of Quebec's particularity. It is equally certain
that the rest of Canada is unwilling to grant any such formal recognition
in the Constitution. One message from the Meech round was the
unwillingness of the rest of Canada to accept any significant asymmetry
between the position of Quebec and that of the other provinces. It is
clear that any "asymmetrical" solution - ranging from special status
to sovereignty-association - could never secure the consent required
under the general amending formula. However, granting the new
powers which Quebec demands to all the provinces - the approach
followed at Meech - is unlikely to prove workable either. The
demands of Quebec are likely to be so far-reaching that to grant these
powers to all the provinces would amount to a dismemberment of the
federation.
2) The prospects for success are even further complicated by
uncertainty over the nature of the process that will be utilized.
The Meech process may have been unwieldy, but at least there
was a generally accepted understanding of the ground rules governing
the negotiations. There is unlikely to be even this minimal common
ground in the post-Meech negotiations. Following the failure of the
Meech Lake Accord, Premier Bourassa announced that the government
of Quebec was no longer willing to sit at the constitutional table as
one of ten provinces. The Premier declared that in the future Quebec
would discuss its proposals on a bilateral basis with the federal
government.
If Quebec adheres to this approach, then it will have very
significant implications for the ability of the federation to respond to
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Quebec's new demands. There can be little doubt that Quebec's new
constitutional agenda will go significantly beyond what was negotiated
at Meech Lake. This will mean that any formal constitutional amendment will certainly require the consent of all other provinces as well
as the federal government, under the terms of the Constitution Act,
1982. The only institutional forum where the necessary trade-offs can
be made in order to obtain the required provincial consent would be a
meeting of all First Ministers.
A refusal by Quebec to participate in a First Ministers' meeting
might lead to an attempt to construct an alternative process. This fallback process might consist of two stages. First, the federal government
would undertake bilateral negotiations with Quebec. Second, it would
undertake negotiations with the remaining nine provinces. But this
two-stage process is an imperfect and unsatisfactory substitute for a
single meeting of all governments and is unlikely to work. There
would be no process for forcing the comprehensive trade-offs that
would be necessary in order to produce an amendment acceptable to
all the provinces. I conclude that an insistence on "bilateral negotiations" between Quebec and Ottawa will preclude, for all practical
purposes, any formal constitutional amendment using the general
amending formula.
3) There is a very real possibility, perhaps even a probability,
that the next round of constitutional negotiations will result at some
point in a stalemate. A stalemate may result in a unilateral attempt by
the province of Quebec to jump outside the existing legal rules.
Any attempt to secure unanimous agreement on a comprehensive
constitutional amendment is unlikely to succeed. This means any
negotiations which are conducted are likely to result in an impasse. At
this point the government of Quebec will have a very difficult and
fateful choice to make. This choice is simply whether it is prepared
to continue to operate within the confines of the Constitution Act,
1982. Faced with a stalemate, Quebec may attempt to jump outside
the existing constitutional arrangements through some form of unilateral
declaration.
There would no doubt be an attempt to challenge the legality of
such a unilateral declaration by certain interests in English Canada,
but the ultimate validity of such a declaration would not depend on
the pronouncements of courts or judges. The historical experience with
secession indicates that only force of arms can prevent a state from
seceding. I think it can safely be assumed that the rest of Canada is
not prepared to undertake any such adventurism in Quebec's case.
4) Any resort to such a unilateral declaration by Quebec would
have very serious negative consequences, both for Quebec as well as
the rest of Canada.
It is clear that any break in legal continuity would be profoundly
destabilizing. There would be a period of legal and political uncertainty
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as various contending governments and interests struggled to assert the
primacy of their preferred legal regime. In turn, this uncertainty would
undermine the confidence of foreign and domestic investors as well as
the external holders of the national debt, giving rise to a whole series
of second-order economic effects. The precise costs associated with
such a period of instability are impossible to quantify in advance, but
they are certain to be very high and very damaging, producing a
significant drop in the average Canadian's standard of living.
5) The likely outcome of a unilateral declaration by Quebec is
outright independence: sovereignty-association between Quebec and
Canada is simply not a viable option.
Any negotiations over "association" would only occur after Quebec had asserted its legal independence through a unilateral declaration.
Given the bitterness and linguistic tension which any such declaration
would produce, there would be little political stomach on either side
for meaningful negotiations over common political institutions. The
fundamental problem would remain the lack of any agreed understanding of Quebec's role in Canada. Sovereignty-association is essentially
"particular status" writ large, a concept which has proven politically
unacceptable outside the province of Quebec.
A second, equally significant, roadblock is that sovereignty-association requires the existence of two separate legal entities; the
province of Quebec on the one hand and the "rest of Canada" on the
other. However, there is no political or legal entity representing the
"rest of Canada": neither the other provincial governments nor the
federal government has any legal or political mandate to speak for the
nine provinces outside Quebec. Thus, before negotiating sovereigntyassociation with Quebec, the "rest of Canada" must first agree on its
own political structure. It is far from certain that any negotiations
would even get beyond this initial stage; there is no guarantee that the
remaining nine provinces would be capable of reconstituting a new
political union, for reasons outlined below.
6) There is a very strong possibility that the remaining nine
provinces would not be able to construct an enduring political arrangement in the absence of Quebec.
In the immediate aftermath of a unilateral declaration by Quebec,
there would no doubt be very strong public sentiment in favour of
building a new political arrangement involving all of the remaining
nine provinces. But even if such an arrangement could be constructed
in the short-term, it would be unstable and liable to break apart. The
fundamental problem would be the economic and political dominance
of Ontario, which would possess approximately half of the population
and generate over 50 per cent of the economic activity of the new
state. The dominance of Ontario would create an imbalance which
would be difficult to accommodate in the political institutions of the
new federation. Moreover, the negotiations over the new federation
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would be dominated by the provincial governments, which would each
assert a veto over the shape of the new political system. It is probable
that the result would be an even more decentralized federation with
limited powers for the federal government and a weakened commitment
to inter-regional transfers. It is difficult to see what the concrete,
practical advantages of such a form of government would be to the
various parts of the new federation. Even if it could be created in the
short term, it is unlikely to prove an enduring form of political
association.
7) Thus the most probable result of a unilateral declaration by
Quebec would be independencefor Quebec, coupled by relatively weak
and short-term political connections between the remaining nine provinces.
It should be emphasized that any scenario resulting from a break
in legal continuity is likely to be extremely fluid and subject to radical
change in relatively short periods of time. It is unlikely, for example,
that any decentralized arrangement between nine provinces would prove
to be enduring; one would likely see almost immediate attempts to
create wholly new arrangements involving regional groupings of provinces. In fact, in the wake of the failure of the Meech Lake Accord,
there has already been vague talk of new "regional blocs" emerging
in both the West and in Atlantic Canada. These discussions would
assume a central place on the political agenda in the absence of
Quebec.
8) This suggests that an important imperative for all parties in
the coming round of constitutional discussions is to avoid a break in
legal continuity.
The analysis thus far suggests that a break in legal continuity will
set in motion a chain of events which no one can control and which
will produce serious costs for everyone. This means that all parties
have an interest in avoiding a break with legal continuity and searching
for ways to find accommodations within the existing legal regime. One
way to achieve this objective is to begin to de-emphasize formal
constitutional amendments involving the general amending formula.
Given the extremely low possibility of success under this formula,
coupled with the high costs of failure, it would seem important to
identify and to explore any other alternatives which might exist.
9) One such alternative is informal constitutional change involving administrative or intergovernmental agreements.
It is significant that four of the five conditions identified by
Quebec in the Meech round might have been achieved through informal, administrative arrangements or through statutory amendments.
Quebec's powers over immigration had already been increased through
an administrative agreement signed in 1978 by the federal government
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and Quebec; 60 the claim for increased powers in the field of immigration could have been accommodated through amendments to that
agreement. Quebec participation in the selection of three judges on the
Supreme Court of Canada might also have been regulated through an
agreement of this type, as could limits on federal spending in Quebec.
The demand for a "veto" on future constitutional amendments could
have been met through the federal government agreeing that its veto
would be utilized to protect the fundamental interests of Quebec. Only
the demand for recognition as a "distinct society" could not be dealt
with through administrative agreement.
There are obviously both advantages and disadvantages to informal changes of this type. The advantages are that administrative
agreements do not compel recourse to the cumbersome mechanisms
required for formal constitutional change. Administrative agreements
also do not give rise to the same symbolism associated with formal
constitutional change. Thus the negotiation of an administrative agreement is much less likely to arouse the same degree of comment and
controversy in the rest of the country. Of course, the muted symbolism
attached to an administrative agreement is in some sense a disadvantage
as well as an advantage. The profound symbolism surrounding the
failure of the Meech Lake Accord suggests that any lasting resolution
must necessarily involve some symbolic component. It is unlikely,
therefore, that the Quebec government or the Quebec public would be
able to accept a package which did not include some formal constitutional change.
10) The only realistic prospect for accomplishing constitutional
change to accommodate Quebec under the existing legal procedures
is section 43 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
Under section 43, it is possible for the federal Parliament and a
single provincial legislature to enact an amendment without reference
to the other provinces. Such an amendment must be limited to constitutional provisions which apply to "one or more, but not all, provinces...". This somewhat limits the scope of any possible amendment
utilizing this procedure. But it is noteworthy that a clause along the
lines of the "distinct society" clause might have been enacted on the
basis of the section 43 procedure.
This possibility is reflected in the "Final Communiqu6" issued
by the First Ministers' Meeting on the Constitution, signed on June 9,
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de l'Immigration, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERN-

MENT OF CANADA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC WITH REGARD TO CO-OPERATION ON IMMIGRATION MATTERS AND ON THE SELECTION OF FOREIGN NATIONALS
WISHING TO SETTLE EITHER PERMANENTLY OR TEMPORARILY IN QUEBEC (Quebec
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1990. The June 1990 agreement proposed a constitutional amendment
which would have recognized that "within New Brunswick, the English
linguistic community and the French linguistic community have equality of status and equal rights and privileges". 6' The proposed amendment would also have affirmed the "role of the legislature and government of New Brunswick: to preserve and promote the equality of
status and equal rights and privileges of the province's two official
linguistic communities". 62 In short, this proposed amendment tracked
in fairly precise terms the "distinct society" clause in the Meech Lake
Accord, with the exception that the amendment would have specified
that it applied within New Brunswick alone. What is significant is that
the June 1990 agreement specifically provided that this amendment
would be enacted under the section 43 procedure, with only New
Brunswick and Canada required to approve resolutions.
11) This suggests that the outcome with the greatest possibility
of success is one involving some combination of section 43 of the
Constitution Act, 1982 along with informal administrativeagreements.
This conclusion is important because it indicates the path which
the federal government should follow beginning in the spring of 1991.
There should be no attempt to reopen the constitutional dossier on a
comprehensive basis at the intergovernmental level. Since such negotiations are certain to fail, they should never be commenced. Instead,
discussions between governments should proceed on a bilateral and
relatively low-key basis; this should be coupled with the initiation of
other non-governmentalprocesses which might respond to some of the
demands for greater public involvement in constitutional change.
12) In terms of non-governmentalprocesses, it will be important
to devise flexible mechanisms which will permit broad participation,
promote continuing dialogue and avoid stalemate.
There are a variety of mechanisms which might fulfill these
requirements. The agreement signed by First Ministers in June, 1990
suggested one possible alternative. The First Ministers agreed to establish a body composed of legislators from each province to hold national
hearings and prepare specific proposals for future Senate reform. The
report of the national commission would not be binding on any
government or legislature and any individual legislator would be free
to dissent from the findings of the majority.
There are certain important advantages to this approach. The first,
and perhaps the most important, is simply that it buys time. The

61 First Ministers' Meeting on the Constitution, Final Communique, Document
No. 800-029/006 (Ottawa, 9-10 June 1990) cl. 6.
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holding of hearings across the country and the preparation of a report
takes time. It also provides a forum within which a dialogue can occur
and where trade-offs can be made. It is also significant that the
deliberations of the commission would not be subject to the unanimity
rule. While the commission's report would still have to be approved
by all governments and legislatures before an amendment could be
enacted, it would have the potential to carry considerable moral weight
in those discussions. Finally, a commission provides for public hearings
and thus a measure of popular consultation in the formulation of
constitutional proposals. This is a direct and meaningful response to
the criticisms of the closed-door character of the Meech discussions.
13) The late spring and summer of 1991 constitutes a key turning
point in the future round.
The Quebec Parliamentary Commission will report in late March
1991. It is certain that the Commission's proposals will come as a
considerable shock to the rest of the country. Outside of Quebec, there
is simply no interest in constitutional discussions at the present time.
Nor will this change until March of 1991. Then, once Quebec tables
its proposals, there is likely to be an immediate and overwhelmingly
negative reaction from other parts of the country. This, in turn, will
further radicalize Quebec opinion and reinforce the view that fundamental change is necessary. There is a serious risk of political confrontation and deadlock, with Quebec resorting to some form of
unilateral declaration as a means of breaking this deadlock.
The federal government will be faced with a "catch-22" situation.
To formally reopen the constitutional dossier would be to court almost
certain failure, for the reasons I have outlined. However, to refuse to
respond to Quebec's agenda would be regarded as a repudiation of its
new demands and generate support for a break in legal continuity. The
only possible way to manage this situation is to focus, at least initially,
on issues of process, postponing to some later time a full consideration
of the substantive issues. This appears to have been a primary focus
of federal efforts to date, including the appointment of the Spicer
Commission and the Senate and House of Commons Committee on
the amending formula.
IV. CONCLUSION
The discussions of the past three years have demonstrated to
Canadians that no set of political arrangements is permanent or inevitable. The very idea of Canada, which has been simply taken for
granted by generations of Canadians, is now being called into question.
But if Canada itself is not inevitable, neither is its demise.
It is important to remember in the months and years ahead that
very few of our current problems and challenges are actually constitutional in nature. This may seem somewhat surprising, given the
tendency in the past few years to assume that all Canadian problems
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are constitutional problems demanding constitutional solutions. But the
reality is quite different. Responding to the forces of international
economic competition, cleaning up the environment or dealing with
the continuing problems of poverty and homelessness do not depend
upon constitutional change. The current preoccupation with the Constitution, and the compulsion to turn every political issue into a
constitutional issue, raises a false dilemma. Relatively few of our
current and most pressing political problems are constitutional problems. By continually focussing on the Constitution, we divert our
attention and energy from discovering meaningful solutions.
There seems to be a growing presumption that Canada can only
be salvaged from the trash heap of history if our governing institutions
are fundamentally restructured. This presumption seems to me to be
profoundly misguided and capable of working very great mischief. Our
governing institutions have demonstrated themselves to be remarkably
flexible and adaptable to changing circumstances over the past 125
years. Notwithstanding the current abomination found in the Senate,
there is little reason to believe that any wholesale restructuring of our
institutions is necessary to respond to our current challenges. In this
connection, it is noteworthy that many of the constitutional demands
and discussions of recent years have focused on changes that were
largely symbolic - including the demand by Quebec for recognition
as a distinct society. One should never underestimate the importance
of symbolic issues in Canadian politics. But neither should we resign
ourselves to political fragmentation over questions that have little
bearing on the everyday working lives of most Canadians. The test
for Canadians will be whether we are able to respond to demands for
constitutional change by developing creative solutions that permit all
groups and individuals to honourably retain membership in the community, while preserving those elements of our institutional framework
that have served us well in the past.
It will also be important to continually attempt to expand rather
than to limit the range of possible solutions. The greatest danger will
arise from the false sense that we have exhausted the range of possible
options. This sense is false because there is always a far broader range
of possible solutions and alternatives to a political problem than might
initially be apparent. The challenge is not so much finding those
solutions as it is summoning up the will to look for them in the first
place.

